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RE-EXAMINING THE SHAM DOCTRINE: WHEN SHOULD AN
OVERPAYMENT BE REFLECTED IN BASIS?
MITCHELL M. GANS*
INTRODUCTION
Why would a prudent taxpayer make an acquisition at a price
in excess of fair market value? This inquiry is critical to the deter-
mination of the taxpayer's basis in the asset acquired.
Burdensome tax brackets, coupled with the time-value of
money, particularly crucial during periods of high interest rates,
have induced taxpayers to seek "tax shelters" that provide deferral
of their tax obligations. One type of scheme that offers benefits
similar to those inherent in deferral is the acquisition of assets at
inflated prices. The tax savings attributable to the overpayment -
resulting from depreciation deductions and, where applicable, the
investment tax credit - together with the income generated by
the investment of the tax savings, can exceed the amount of the
overpayment. It will be argued that where a taxpayer intentionally
structures an overpayment for the sole purpose of securing tax sav-
ings and the related investment income, the overpayment should
be treated as a sham and deniedtax effect.
Taxpayers will frequently, though not always, use a nonre-
course note as the centerpiece of a transaction involving an over-
payment. Where the nonrecourse note is substantially in excess of
the fair market value of the acquired asset, it is probable that the
entire transaction is devoid of economic purpose. It will be argued
that, in these circumstances, the use of such a note should result in
a zero basis - that is, the note and any cash investment, should be
disregarded for purposes of taxation.
Not all overpayments, however, should activate the sham doc-
trine. Intentional overpayments must be distinguished from those
that are engendered by erroneous assumptions of value. Taxpayers
who mistakenly agree to pay an inflated price should not be pre-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Hofstra University, School of Law.
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cluded by the sham doctrine from reflecting the entire purchase
price, including the overpayment, in their basis computation. In
addition, taxpayers occasionally make acquisitions at a price in ex-
cess of value in order to secure an additional benefit or service
from the seller. The sham doctrine should not apply to such acqui-
sitions. The appropriate tax treatment for the overpayment should
be a function of the nature of the additional benefit or service
secured.
Although the principal subject of this article is the sham doc-
trine, and not the likelihood-of-payment rationale that has evolved
concerning nonrecourse notes, a cursory review of this rationale is
an appropriate starting point.
I. THE LIKELIHOOD-OF-PAYMENT RATIONALE
The likelihood-of-payment rationale derives from the Supreme
Court's analysis in Crane v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.1
For purposes of basis computations, the rationale requires classifi-
cation of nonrecourse liabilities incurred in connection with the ac-
quisition of an asset in accordance with the probability that the
taxpayer will discharge the liability. The nonrecourse nature of a
liability, though it may, in some circumstances, reduce the
probability of payment, does not always mandate the exclusion of
the liability from the basis computation. The rationale distin-
guishes those nonrecourse liabilities that are likely to be dis-
charged from those that are not; only the former are properly re-
flected in basis.2
1. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
2. There is a limitation on the tax benefits attributable to nonrecourse debt even if the
debt is includible in basis. I.R.C. § 465 provides that a taxpayer can only deduct losses to
the extent that he is at risk. (Since a taxpayer who delivers a nonrecourse note is not consid-
ered to be at risk, § 465 circumscribes the tax benefits associated with the inclusion of the
note in basis.) Real estate investments, however, are not subject to § 465. Moreover, the
investment tax credit is computed by reference to basis without regard to the at-risk con-
cept of § 465. See Treas. Reg. § 1-46-3(c)(1) (1979) and Rev. Rul. 80-235, 1980-2 C.B. 229.
With respect, however, to property placed in service after February 18, 1981, the at-risk
concept has been made applicable to the investment credit computation subject to certain
exceptions. I.R.C. § 46(c)(8), as amended by The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, §
211(f) Pub. L. No. 97-34, - Stat. - (1981) [hereinafter cited as The Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981]. The application of § 465 may also be limited by virtue of its effective date.
Thus, while § 465 has a significant role to play with respect to nonrecourse debt, there is
still much tax benefit inherent in such debt provided that it is includible in basis.
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A. Market Value Greater Than Liability
Where the fair market value of an asset is greater than the
nonrecourse debt incurred upon its acquisition, there is sufficient
likelihood of payment to warrant its inclusion in basis.- A taxpayer
making such an acquisition will be motivated to discharge the debt
in order to avoid forfeiture of the asset in a foreclosure proceeding.
In Crane, the Supreme Court indicated that this motivation is a
function of "the reality that an owner of property mortgaged at a
figure less than that at which the property will sell, must and will
treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as if they were his per-
sonal obligations."4
The rationale does not concern itself with the purchase price.
of the asset. As the Supreme Court indicated, so long as the fair
market value of the asset is in excess of the encumbering debt,
there is sufficient likelihood of payment regardless of the purchase
price. Assume, for example, that a taxpayer purchases an asset
with a fair market value of $100 by delivering to the seller $50 in"
cash and a nonrecourse note, secured by the asset, in the amount
of $50. There is sufficient likelihood of payment to warrant inclu-
sion of the note in basis inasmuch as it is highly likely that the
taxpayer will discharge his obligation to pay the $50 on the note in
order to retain the asset, which is worth $100; basis in these cir-
cumstances is equal to $100. Would the likelihood of payment be
reduced if the taxpayer were to deliver to the seller the same non-
recourse note and $75 instead of $50 in cash?5 Immediately after
he delivered the cash and the note to the seller, and acquired the
asset, the taxpayer is confronted with an asset (value of $100)
which would be forfeited in a foreclosure proceeding if the $50 ob-
ligation were not discharged. Since, in both of the hypotheticals
3. Nonrecourse debt, even if in compliance with the likelihood-of-payment rationale, is
nevertheless excluded from basis if found to be contingent in nature. For a brief discussion
of the contingency doctrine, see note 18 infra. Indeed, recourse debt, which need not comply
with the likelihood-of-payment rationale in order to be reflected in basis, is, if contingent in
nature, also excluded from the basis computation. See Landis, Liabilities and Purchase
Price, 27 TAx LAw. 67 (1974).
4. 331 U.S. at 14. It should be noted, however, that this statement was made in the
context of the Court's analysis of the taxpayer's amount realized and was not alluded to in
the Court's discussion of basis. See Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Basis: Mrs. Crane
Where Are You Now? 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 39 (1979).
5. For an explanation of the factors which might motivate a taxpayer to make such an
overpayment, see text & accompanying notes 51-62 infra.
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posited, the relationship of the fair market value of the asset to the
nonrecourse note is identical, the likelihood of payment is also
identical, irrespective of whether the cash payment is $50 or $75 -
once made, the cash payment is, in an economic sense, "lost" and
thus is entirely irrelevant to the taxpayer's decision to pay on the
note. In neither case does the likelihood-of-payment rationale pre-
clude the inclusion of the nonrecourse note in basis. In sum, the
amount of the cash payment and hence the purchase price is of no
significance in the context of the rationale.'
B. Market Value Equals Liability
Where the fair market value of the asset is equal to the nonre-
course debt incurred upon its acquisition, one might conclude that,
there being no equity to protect, the likelihood of payment is not
sufficient to warrant including the liability in basis. Crane, how-
ever, rejected this notion, holding that such a nonrecourse debt is
to be treated in the same manner as a nonrecourse debt that is less
than the value of the encumbered asset." In Crane, the taxpayer
inherited real property which was subject to a debt that the tax-
payer did not assume. The property's fair market value was equal
to the amount of the encumbering liability. Despite the absence of
any equity, the Court held that the taxpayer's basis was equal to
the asset's fair market value - that is, the nonrecourse debt was
includible in the basis computation. Thus, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that sufficient likelihood of payment exists where the
amount of the nonrecourse debt is equal to the asset's fair market
value.
While Crane involved inherited property,8 the courts and com-
mentators have reached a similar conclusion in the context of
property acquired by purchase.9 In Bolger v. Commissioner,10 the
6. But see Simmons, supra note 4, at 39, where the author suggests that the relation-
ship of purchase price to market value is pertinent.
7. 331 U.S. at 9-11.
8. With respect to such property, basis is determined pursuant to I.R.C. § 1014.
9. I.R.C. § 1012 is the operative basis section with respect to property acquired by
purchase. Crane's holding, to the effect that nonrecourse debt may, in the context of inher-
ited property, be included in basis, has been extended to § 1012. See Blackstone Theatre
Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 801 (1949); Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340 (1966);
Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973); Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 554 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976); Gibson Products Co. v. United States, 460 F. Supp.
1109 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Narver v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 53 (1980); Adams, Exploring the
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Internal Revenue Service (the Service) argued that a nonrecourse
liability incurred in connection with the purchase of an asset
should not be included in basis where the amount of the liability
equals the fair market value of the property encumbered.1 In such
circumstances, the Service argued, the taxpayer has no incentive to
discharge the debt and the likelihood of payment, therefore, is suf-
ficiently minimal to warrant the exclusion of the debt from the ba-
sis computation. The Tax Court, rejecting this argument, con-
cluded that the taxpayer had a sufficient motivation to discharge
the debt such that inclusion of the debt in the basis computation
was appropriate.' 2 The motivation cited by the court consisted of
two elements:"3 1) each payment to be made in discharge of the
liability would potentially create additional gain on the ultimate
sale of the asset and refinancing possibilities; and 2) by continuing
to make payments on the debt, the taxpayer would be able to re-
tain the property and thereby enjoy any appreciation attributable
to inflation or other factors.
Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine: An Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L.
REv. 159 (1966); Lurie, Bolger's Building: The Tax Shelter That Wore No Clothes, 28 TAx
L. REv. 355 (1973); Simmons, supra note 4; McGuire, Negative Capital Accounts and the
Failing Tax Shelter, 3 J. OF REAL ESTATE TAx. 439 (1976); Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58;
Rev. Rul. 78-29, 1978-1 C.B. 62; Rev. RUl. 79-432, 1979-2 C.B. 289; Rev. Rul. 80-42, 1980-1
C.B. 182; Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some
Tax Efforts in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PENN. L. Rxv. 69 (1969); Note, Tax Shelters,
Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAx L. REv. 277 (1978); Weidner, Realty Shel-
ters: Nonrecourse Financing, Tax Reform, and Profit Purpose, 32 Sw. L.J. 711 (1978);
Posin, Tax Shelters: The Continuing Struggle, 6 HOFsTRA L. REv. 919 (1978).
10. 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
11. It has been suggested that this argument was foreclosed by the Supreme Court in
Crane. Lurie, supra note 9, at 370. The Service, however, may have resurrected this argu-
ment in Rev. RUl. 79-432, 1979-2 C.B. 289. There, the Service asserted the position that
where the entire purchase price is paid by the delivery of a nonrecourse note, it is appropri-
ate to infer that the fair market value of the asset is less than the amount of the note. The
inference is derived from the notion that a prudent seller would not sell an asset that could
produce a given sum in cash in the marketplace for a nonrecourse note in the same amount.
Applying the likelihood-of-payment rationale in this situation, the entire debt should be
excluded from the basis computation. See text accompanying notes 14-35 infra. Unless the
taxpayer is able to rebut this inference by establishing that the fair market value of the
asset is at least equal to the amount of the nonrecourse note, the Service should prevail. See
also Rev. Rul. 80-235, 1980-2 C.B. 229, where the Service, in concluding that a nonrecourse
debt was not includible in basis, may have implicitly utilized this inference, although no
reference was made to Rev. RUl. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58; Rev. Rul. 78-29, 1978-1 C.B. 62; or
the likelihood-of-payment rationale.
12. 59 T.C. at 771.
13. Id. at 770.
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Both of these elements are concerned with the equity that
arises after the acquisition of the property. It would seem that the
Tax Court's reliance on these motivating factors is an appropriate
reading of Crane. Although the Crane Court did not specifically
articulate its reliance on such factors, it is apparent that the Court
viewed them to be sufficiently significant to allow Mrs. Crane to
include the nonrecourse liability, which was equal to the fair mar-
ket value of the encumbered property, in her basis computation.
Thus the Bolger court properly construed Crane as establishing
the proposition that where the nonrecourse liability is equal to the
fair market value of the assets, there is sufficient likelihood of pay-
ment to include the liability in basis.
C. Liability Greater than Market Value
With respect to nonrecourse debt that is in excess of the fair
market value of the encumbered asset, the Crane Court, noting
that the situation confronting it was different, 14 declined to express
a view. Recent authorities indicate, however, that there is no likeli-
hood of payment where nonrecourse debt is substantially in excess
of the fair market value of the property. In Estate of Franklin v.
Commissioner,"5 the court held that a nonrecourse debt incurred in
connection with the acquisition of a motel was not includible in the
basis computation, because the taxpayer failed to prove that the
value of the motel was at least approximately equal to the amount
of the debt. This failure of proof, in the court's view, required the
conclusion that there was no likelihood of payment - only an im-
prudent taxpayer would discharge a nonrecourse debt in order to
retain an asset with a value that is substantially less than the
amount of the debt.
A similar situation arose in Gibson Products Co. v. United
States,1 where a partnership, of which the taxpayer was a mem-
ber, purchased oil and gas leases and a contractual promise to drill
certain test wells. In addition to a cash payment, the partnership
paid for the wells and drilling contract by delivering a nonrecourse
note in the amount of $660,000. After finding that the fair market
14. 331 U.S. at 12.
15. 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
16. 460 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981).
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value of the property securing the note was only $63,500,17 the
court held that no part of the note was includible in the basis com-
putation."" The court's holding was premised on the likelihood-of-
payment rationale:
The basib underlying rationale of Crane is that a liability should be included
in basis, even if the taxpayer has no personal liability because the taxpayer
can be expected to satisfy the liability rather than lose the property. This
assumption is true only if the property's value is equal to the amount of the
debt. If the value of the property is less than the amount of the nonrecourse
debt, it can not be assumed that the taxpayer will necessarily make full pay-
ment, or treat the liability as if it were his own.19
17. The note was secured by the leases, certain operating equipment, and 80% of the
income derived from the leases. Id. at 1112.
18. The court held, alternatively, that the note was not includible in basis by virtue of
its contingent nature. Citing, inter alia, Lemery v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 367 (1969) and
Denver Rio Grande Western R.R. Co. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1266 (Ct. Cl. 1974), the
court stated: "These cases hold that an obligation, which is too contingent and speculative,
should not be included in cost basis, irrespective of the possible application of the Crane
doctrine." 460 F.Supp. at 1115. Since the note would not be discharged in the absence of oil
and gas production, the court concluded that the note was sufficiently contingent to bring it
within the scope of the cited cases. The Fifth Circuit, in affirming, held that the contingent
nature of the liability precluded the taxpayer from accruing the deduction and hence did
not directly address the contingency question in the basis context.
The Service, in Rev. Rul. 80-235, 1980-2 C.B. 229, applied the contingency doctrine in
determining whether a nonrecourse note secured by a commercially untested oil converter
was includible in basis. It reasoned that, since the nonrecourse note would only be dis-
charged if the converter generated income, the note was contingent. In reaching its conclu-
sion, however, the Service failed to take into account that upon maturity of the note, there
would be recourse against the converter in the foreclosure proceeding. The presence of this
recourse against the converter distinguishes the ruling from Gibson where, as the court
found, there was only recourse against the income inherent in the oil and gas production.
Moreover, the Service's position, that the note was contingent upon the success of the con-
verter and, therefore, not includible in basis, is inconsistent with Bolger v. Commissioner, 59
T.C. at 771 and Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. at 353, 354. But see Gibson, 637 F.2d
1041, where the court (citing Fielder, Drilling Funds and Nonrecourse Loans - Some Tax
Questions, 24 Sw. Legal Foundation Inst. on Oil & Gas Taxation 527 (1973)) suggested that
Mayerson and Bolger should not apply - i.e., the contingency doctrine should be invoked
- with respect to nonrecourse debt secured by assets subject to "sudden developments
[that] might reduce the value of the property below the amount of the unpaid indebted-
ness." 637 F.2d at 1049 (brackets supplied by court). Nevertheless, the Service's holding,
that the note was not includible in basis, perhaps is sustainable on a likelihood-of-payment
analysis. See note 11 supra. Also, if the useful life of the converter had been shorter than
the term of the note, the contingency doctrine would have been applicable, for, in these
circumstances, there would only be recourse against the income generated by the converter.
See Marcus v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1263 (1971).
19. 460 F. Supp. at 1117. The Fifth Circuit noted, with approval, the District Court's
likelihood-of-payment analysis, though it affirmed on a different ground.
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The Tax Court, in Narver v. Commissioner,20 recently engaged
in the same analysis. There, the taxpayer purchased real property
with a fair market value of not more than $412,000, at a price of
$1,800,000.21 The entire purchase price was paid by the delivery of
a nonrecourse note. Relying on the likelihood-of-payment ratio-
nale, the court held that no portion of the note was includible in
basis,22 inasmuch as it would not have been reasonable to discharge
a $1,800,000 nonrecourse obligation solely in order to retain prop-
erty with a value of not more than $412,000.23
The Internal Revenue Service, relying on Franklin and Crane,
utilized the likelihood-of-payment rationale in Rev. Rul. 77-110.24
There, a partnership purchased film exhibition rights by delivering
$200x and a nonrecourse note, secured by the film rights, in the
amount of $1,800x. After first noting that the partnership was una-
ble to "demonstrate that the fair market value of the acquired film
rights at least approximated the amount of the nonrecourse obliga-
tion," 25 the Service concluded that no portion of the nonrecourse
note could be reflected in basis; the partnership's basis in the film
rights was held to equal the amount of the cash payment, $200x.20
The Service's holding was premised on its conclusion that it was
not "reasonable from an economic point of view for [the partner-
ship] to make a capital investment in the amount of the unpaid
purchase price," 27 since the value of the film rights was substan-
tially less than the balance of the note. Indeed, a prudent taxpayer,
in these circumstances, would certainly prefer to forfeit the asset
in a foreclosure proceeding.28
20. 75 T.C. 53 (1980).
21. Id. at 90.
22. Id. at 98.
23. See Hager v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 759 (1981), where the court, relying on Narver,
held that a nonrecourse debt that unreasonably exceeds the value of the encumbered asset
is not includible in basis.
24. 1977-1 C.B. 58.
25. Id. Although the Service did not explicitly comment on the fair market value of the
acquired film rights, it was indicated that the corporation from which the partnership had
purchased the rights paid $200x for the rights just a few months before the resale to the
partnership. One might, therefore, infer that the fair market value of the rights was approxi-
mately $200x.
26. For a discussion of this conclusion under the sham doctrine, see text & accompany-
ing notes 145-59 infra.
27. 1977-1 C.B. at 59 (quoting Estate of Franklin, 544 F.2d at 1049).
28. The Service has made a similar analysis, comparing the amount of the nonrecourse
debt with the value of the encumbered asset in order to determine likelihood of payment, in
[Vol. 30
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These authorities, Franklin, Gibson, Narver, and Rev. Rul. 77-
110, share two similarities. First, each of these authorities held
that no portion of the nonrecourse debt was includible in basis.
Although it has been suggested that where the nonrecourse debt is
in excess of the value of the encumbered asset basis should equal
the value of the asset,29 the unanimous conclusion of these authori-
ties that such a debt should be excluded from basis would appear
to be sound. 0 To be sure, it would make little economic sense for a
taxpayer to discharge his obligation on such a nonrecourse note to
the extent of the fair market value of the encumbered asset, for,
upon the cessation of payments on the note, the asset would never-
theless be lost in a foreclosure proceeding. Since, it would be im-
prudent for a taxpayer to make any payment on such a nonre-
course note, no portion of the debt should be includible in the
basis computation.$1
The second similarity shared by these authorities is the exis-
tence of a substantial disparity between the amount of the nonre-
course debt and the value of the encumbered asset. By virtue of
this substantial difference, the courts and the Internal Revenue
Service had no difficulty concluding that there was no likelihood of
payment. What result should obtain, however, where the nonre-
course debt exceeds the value of the asset by only one dollar?3 2
Presumably, a taxpayer would be as likely to discharge such a debt
as he would be to discharge a nonrecourse debt exactly equal to
the value of the asset. In fact, it has been properly concluded that
the debt, in order to be includible in basis, need only approximate
the value of the asset.33
The determination of the amount by which a taxpayer may
structure a nonrecourse debt to exceed the value of the encum-
bered asset without adversely affecting the likelihood-of-payment
Rev. Rul. 78-29, 1978-1 C.B. 62; Rev. Rul. 79-432, 1979-2 C.B. 289; Rev. Rul. 80-42, 1980-1
C.B. 182. See also Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 C.B. 59. See text & accompanying notes 176-202
infra.
29. See Adams, supra note 9, at 165; Del Cotto, supra note 9, at 73.
30. But cf. Posin, supra note 9, at 933, where the author suggests that with respect to
real estate, nonrecourse notes should always be included in basis regardless of likelihood of
payment.
31. For a further analysis, see Simmons, supra note 4.
32. See Adams, supra note 9, at 165, where the author poses this question.
33. See Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d at 1047-48; Rev. Rul. 77-110,
1977-1 C.B. 58; Rev. Rul. 78-29, 1978-1 C.B. 62.
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analysis will turn upon a simple question: Given the value of the
asset and the unpaid balance on the debt, would it be reasonable,
from an economic perspective, for the taxpayer to discharge the
debt?3 4 The resolution of this question can only be made on a case-
by-case basis.3 5
II. THE SHAM DOCTRINE
The conclusion that a nonrecourse note is not violative of the
likelihood-of-payment rationale does not necessarily suggest that
basis should equal the purchase price. Indeed, basis should not
equal purchase price in any transaction, whether or not a nonre-
course note is involved - and, where a nonrecourse note is uti-
lized, irrespective of the conclusion reached with respect to the
34. See note 33 supra. In determining whether or not.it is economically reasonable for a
taxpayer to discharge a nonrecourse debt, it may be necessary to consider the rate of inter-
est that the debt bears in relation to the prevailing rate in the marketplace for a comparable
debt. For example, assume that a taxpayer is about to purchase an asset with a fair market
value of $200 by delivering a nonrecourse note in the same amount and that 15% would be
the appropriate rate of interest for such a note in the marketplace. If the taxpayer were to
agree to deliver the $200 note, bearing interest at the rate of 15%, the note would be includ-
ible in basis, inasmuch as the value of the asset would equal the amount of the note. If,
however, the note were structured to bear interest at the rate of 10% and the face amount
of the note were increased above $200, in order to compensate for the lower interest rate,
would a likelihood-of-payment analysis require that the note be excluded from basis? Al-
though the note would now have a face amount in excess of the fair market value of the
asset, the taxpayer, from an economic perspective, would be as likely to discharge such a
note as he would be to discharge a $200 note bearing interest at 15%. In both cases, the
taxpayer would have to pay the same number of dollars in order to retain the asset, al-
though the composition of the dollars would be different - more interest and a compensat-
ing amount of less principal would be required by the 15% note. Thus, in both cases, the
note should be includible in basis. For a discussion of whether the sham doutrine should
apply where the face amount of a note is increased in order to compensate for a bargain
interest rate, see text & accompanying notes 66-80 infra. For the computation of basis in
such circumstances, see text & accompanying notes 81-92 infra.
35. See Simmons, supra note 4, at 46, where the author suggests that a variety of fac-
tors, such as the income that the property is expected to generate, may lead the court to a
finding of economic reasonableness. But see Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58 and Rev. Rul,
78-29, 1978-1 C.B. 62, where the Service explicitly concludes that the focus should be on the
relationship of market value to unpaid balance on the debt and implicitly suggests that the
income that the property is expected to generate is only relevant as a factor in the determi-
nation of market value. The Service's view apparently rests on the notion that it would not
be reasonable, economically, for a taxpayer to make the investment necessary to avoid fore-
closure where the value of the asset is substantially less than the required investment. In-
deed, in these circumstances, a prudent taxpayer who is anxious to secure the income inher-
ent in the asset would take his capital to the marketplace and buy a comparable asset for a
sum lesser than that required to avoid foreclosure.
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likelihood-of-payment rationale - where a violation of the sham
doctrine is found to exist.
A. Background
The sham doctrine has been applied in various contexts 8 for
the purpose of separating those business transactions that the In-
ternal Revenue Service is required to respect from those that are
not entitled to deference. The doctrine, in effect, creates a thresh-
old - all business transactions must, at a minimum, satisfy the
doctrine's requirements or be disregarded for purposes of taxation.
The Supreme Court has made clear that in order to pass this
threshold a business transaction must be motivated, at least in
part, by an economic objective.3 7 Thus, taxpayers remain free to
structure their business affairs for the purpose of tax avoidance,
provided that non-tax (business) motivation is present as well.sa
36. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Higgins, Collector of Inter-
nal Revenue v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Gregory v. Helvering, C.LR., 293 U.S. 465 (1935);
Thompson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 631 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1980); Bridges v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 325 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963); Braddock Land Co. v.
Commissioner, 75 T.C. 324 (1980); Morris v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 21 (1972); Bixby v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757 (1972); Estate of Melcher v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH)
1010 (1970).
37. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Knetsch v. United
States, 364 U.S. 361; Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465.
The precise quantum of business purpose necessary in order to avoid the sham doctrine,
an unresolved question for many years (see Rice, The Judicial Techniques in Combating
Tax Avoidance, 51 MicH. L. REv. 1021, 1043-44 (1953)), has yet to be addressed by the
Supreme Court. Perhaps, the necessary quantum of business purpose should bear a direct
relationship to the magnitude of the tax benefit inherent in the transaction. Cf. ALI PRO-
POSALS FOR CHANGES iN THE RuLES FOR TAxATiON OF PARTNERS, Tent. Draft No. 3, at 108
(Mar. 27, 1979) (where it is suggested that in the partnership allocation context, there must
be a balancing of the economic effect against the tax-reduction potential). See also Estate of
Cohen v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1221 (1970) (where the court indicated that inter-
est is only deductible if the transaction presents more than "a slight or remote possibility of
a profit .... Id. at 1227.).
38. Although its impact is not clear, I.R.C. § 183, which proscribes deductions attribu-
table to activities non-profit in nature, may be viewed as incorporating concepts similar to
those inherent in the sham doctrine. See Jasionowski v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 312 (1976);
Weidner, Realty Shelters: Nonrecourse Financing, Tax Reform and Profit Purpose, 32 Sw.
L.J. 711, 744 (1978). It would appear that whenever economic motivation is completely lack-
ing such that the sham doctrine is applicable, § 183 would, a fortiori, be operative as well.
That is not to say, however, that the sham doctrine is applicable to all transactions that
run afoul of § 183. In Hager v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 759 (1981), the court indicated that
the test for determining the applicability of § 183 is whether "the primary purpose and
intention in engaging in the activity is to make a profit." Id. at 784. Hence, if the primary
purpose for entering into a transaction is tax avoidance, § 183 will apply even though there
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In Higgins v. Smith, 9 the Court explicated its concept of the
sham doctrine.
[T]he Government may not be required to acquiesce in the taxpayer's elec-
tion of that form for doing business which is most advantageous to him. The
Government may look at actualities and upon determination that the form
employed for doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event is un-
real or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best serves
the purposes of the tax statute.
4
0
The notion that business transactions should be disregarded for
tax purposes if they are "unreal or a sham" has become a funda-
mental principle of tax law.41 The difficulty, however, arises when
one undertakes the task of identifying those business transactions
that fall within the scope of this classification.
Recently, in Frank Lyon v. United States,42 the Supreme
Court had an opportunity to clarify the contours of the classifica-
tion process in the context of a sale-and-leaseback transaction. The
Court concluded that the sale-and-leaseback format selected by
the taxpayer should be respected for tax purposes - the taxpayer-
lessor was held to be entitled to the depreciation deduction
claimed.43 Rejecting the government's invocation of the sham doc-
trine, the Court relied on a finding that non-tax objectives moti-
vated, at least in part, the taxpayer's format selection.
We emphasize that we are not condoning manipulation by a taxpayer through
arbitrary labels and dealings that have no economic significance. Such, how-
ever, has not happened in this case.
In short, we hold that where, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party
transaction with economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by
is an ancillary profit motive. (Perhaps, however, a transaction that is principally motivated
by tax-avoidance objectives can withstand the scrutiny of § 183 if, on an objective analysis,
it is found to be supported by economic substance. For a discussion of the significance of
economic substance to a sham analysis where tax reduction is the sole or principal motiva-
tion for entering into the transaction, see note 46 infra.) The sham doctrine, on the other
hand, should not apply to such a transaction by reason of the presence of the subsidiary
economic objective. But see Rice, supra note 37, at 1043-44. Section 183 may, therefore, be
viewed as having a broader scope than the sham doctrine. Consequently, while a taxpayer
may enter into a transaction that is principally motivated by tax-avoidance objectives with-
out violating the sham doctrine, § 183 may, nevertheless, require that the transaction be
subjected to its limitations.
39. 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
40. Id. at 477.
41. See generally cases cited notes 36-37 supra.
42. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
43. Id. at 583-84.
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business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent considera-
tions, and is not shaped solely by tax avoidance features that have meaning-
less labels attached, the Government should honor the allocation of rights
and duties effectuated by the parties.
44
Approximately eighteen years prior to its decision in Frank
Lyon, the Supreme Court, in Knetsch v. United States,45 focused
the sham doctrine on a taxpayer's claim that his indebtedness had
sufficient substance to support an interest deduction. Disallowing
the interest deduction on the rationale that the indebtedness con-
stituted a sham, the Court was unimpressed by the District Court's
finding that the taxpayer's motive for engaging in the transaction
was tax avoidance. Rather, the Court's decision was a reflection of
the taxpayer's failure to establish the existence of any business or
economic objective for entering into the transaction. It was this
lack of economic objective, not the mere existence of a tax avoid-
ance purpose, that led to the Court's holding.46 Knetsch estab-
44. Id. The Court was obviously persuaded by the lessee-bank's difficulty, by virtue of
state banking statutes and regulations, associated with owning the property that was the
subject of the sale-and-leaseback; indeed, it was these "regulatory realities," explicitly men-
tioned in the Court's holding, which necessitated ownership of the property by one other
than the lessee-such as the taxpayer. While the Court's analysis focuses on many factors,
its linchpin is the non-tax (regulatory) need for one other than the lessee-bank to own the
property. In addition, the Court was obviously persuaded by the economic benefits, from the
taxpayer's viewpoint, that were inherent in the transaction. See Hilton v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 305 (1980).
45. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
46. Where a taxpayer is induced solely by tax-avoidance motives to enter into a trans-
action, the transaction will nevertheless be respected for tax purposes if it presents an op-
portunity for economic profit - i.e., if the transaction is supported by economic substance.
Cf. Solomon, Current Planning for Partnership Startup, Including Special Allocations,
Retroactive Allocations, and Guaranteed Payments, 37 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx. 13-1, 13-45
(1979). The Knetsch Court's emphasis on economic substance, rather than on tax-avoidance
motive, was apparently designed to foster this proposition. The proposition is illustrated by
the acquisition of a tax-sheltered investment for the sole purpose of enjoying the tax-reduc-
tion potential promised by the promoter. Although, from a subjective viewpoint, the tax-
payer is interested only in tax-reduction and does not focus at all on the economic potential
inherent in the investment, the transaction should nevertheless be given tax effect if an
objective analysis of the investment indicates that it presents an opportunity for economic
profit. A contrary conclusion would create significant administrative inconvenience inas-
much as it would require the tax authorities to engage in a subjective examination of the
taxpayer's state of mind even where the transaction in question is, on an objective analysis,
supported by economic substance. Thus, the sham doctrine should not be applied to a trans-
action that has economic substance, even if the taxpayer consummates the transaction
solely in order to accomplish tax avoidance and without any business purpose. But see Es-
tate of Cohen v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1221.
On the other hand, transactions that are devoid of economic substance do not always
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lished the definition of a sham: a transaction entered into solely for
the purpose of tax reduction without any economic or commercial
objective to support it.47
The Supreme Court has thus provided the analytical tools
necessary for distinguishing sham transactions from transactions
that have substance. In sum, a transaction will be respected for tax
purposes, even if tax avoidance is a substantial motive for entering
into the transaction, so long as it is also supported to some extent
by business or economic objectives. Conversely, transactions that
are motivated solely by tax avoidance 48 are classified as "unreal or
constitute a sham. For example, a taxpayer who enters into a transaction that has no eco-
nomic substance on the mistaken assumption that there is potential for economic profit
should not be subjected to the penalty of the sham doctrine. For a further discussion of
mistake, the policy consideration underlying the treatment of mistake and the administra-
tive inconvenience inherent in such treatment, see text & accompanying notes 93-108 infra.
In such cases, the presence of a non-tax motive, the desire to realize the profit potential,
should secure recognition of the transaction for tax purposes. Cf. Dreicer v. Commissioner,
- F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1981), where the court concluded that I.R.C. § 183 is not applicable
to a. transaction that is motivated by the objective of securing a profit, even if there is no
expectation a profit could be realized.
In effect, therefore, where a taxpayer seeks to avoid the sham doctrine by arguing that
he mistakenly assumed that the transaction was supported by economic substance, a subjec-
tive examination of the taxpayer's state of mind is necessary. In contradistinction, a tax-
payer who enters into a transaction for tax-reduction purposes only and seeks to avoid the
sham doctrine by arguing that the transaction presents an opportunity for economic profit
should be subjected to an objective analysis as to whether or not such an opportunity is
present.
Although, therefore, the lack of a business purpose does not inexorably lead to the con-
clusion that economic substance is absent as well, it is assumed, for purposes of this article,
that any transaction that is described as lacking business purpose is also devoid of economic
substance. This assumption is made on the rationale that transactions described here as
lacking business purpose, all of which involve the acquisition of assets at a price that the
taxpayer knows to be in excess of fair market value solely in order to accomplish tax reduc-
tion, cannot be reasonably viewed, at least to the extent of such excess, as having economic
substance.
47. The Fourth Circuit, in Bridges v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963), reads
Knetsch as follows:
The Court in Knetsch held that the tax reduction motive or intent is imma-
terial in such cases and that the determinative question as to "whether what was
done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended" is
answered in the negative if it is apparent "that there was nothing of substance
to be realized by [the taxpayer] from [the] transaction beyond a tax deduction."
There the Court concluded that it was clearly apparent that "Knetsch's transac-
tion . .. did not appreciably affect his beneficial interest except to reduce his
tax." In view of such a finding, the Court held that the transaction was a sham.
Id. at 184 (citation ommitted) (brackets supplied by court). See cases cited note 36 supra.
48. It is assumed that, for purposes of this article, any transaction motivated solely by
tax-avoidance objectives and, therefore, not supported by any business purpose does not
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a sham"'4 and are disregarded for tax purposes.50
have any economic substance. See note 46 supra.
49. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. at 477.
50. The Second Circuit, in Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1986),
concluded that a recourse debt incurred by a taxpayer in connection with the purchase of
Treasury Notes was not a sham, even though the sole motivation for incurring the debt and
entering into the transaction was to secure an interest deduction. The court found that it
was not reasonably possible for the taxpayer to realize a profit on the transaction other than
a tax savings. The court elucidated, to a limited extent, its rationale for rejecting the sham
doctrine in a companion case, Barnett v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1966):
We point out, as we did in Goldstein, that our discussion of a taxpayer's tax
avoidance motives is only pertinent to Section 163(a). We do not hold that the
existence of a tax avoidance motive, standing alone, is always, or even usually,
sufficient to disallow a taxpayer the tax consequences he hopes for when he en-
ters into a transaction.
Id. at 744, n.1. The factors that dissuaded the court from invoking the sham doctrine were:
(1) the debt was recourse and the taxpayer, therefore, might very well sustain an economic
loss; (2) the indebtedness was outstanding for a substantial period of time, and the taxpayer
did, in fact, discharge his interest obligation during this time period; (3) the lenders were
independent financial institutions; and (4) at least one of the notes could be accelerated, at
the lender's will, after 30 days. The court did, however, sustain the disallowance of the § 163
deduction on the theory that such a deduction is only available where the interest obligation
is incurred in a transaction motivated by economic objectives.
The court read Knetsch as establishing the requirement that interest, in order to be
deductible pursuant to § 163, be incurred in a transaction that is economically motivated. In
the Second Circuit's view, however, that is not to suggest that all transactions that are
motivated solely by tax avoidance are shams. Whether the Second Circuit is prepared to
incorporate this economic motivation requirement into other sections of the Code (such as
§ 1012) is unclear. One can only surmise that the Goldstein court did not perceive its eco-
nomic motivation requirement as inherent in the code generally; for had that been its per-
ception, there would not have been any need to suggest, as the court did, that the sham
doctrine and the economic motivation requirement are distinct concepts which do not uni-
versally overlap.
Thus, the Second Circuit may require the presence of some element, in addition to a
complete lack of economic motivation, before invoking the sham doctrine. See also Good-
stein v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959); Nassau Lens Co. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1962); Brown v. United States, 426
F.2d 355 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Estate of Melcher v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1010 (1970);
Estate of Cohen v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1221 (1970); Rothschild v. United
States, 407 F.2d 404 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. United States, 499
F. Supp. 615 (M.D.N.C. 1980). Indeed, some commentators have questioned whether the
interpretation of Knetsch that is offered in the text is the only reasonable one. Blum,
Knetsch v. United States: A Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 135;
Weidner, Realty Shelters: Nonrecourse Financing, Tax Reform, and Profit Purpose, 32 Sw.
L.J. 711 (1978); Young, The Role of Motive in Evaluating Tax Sheltered Investments, 22
TAx LAw. 275 (1969). Nevertheless, these authors would presumably apply, at least insofar
as basis computation is concerned, I.R.C. § 183, the Goldstein doctrine, or, (in the context of
depreciation deductions) the trade or business or production of income requirement of
I.R.C. § 167 or § 168 to deny tax effect to a transaction which completely lacks a business or
economic objective. It is the author's view, however, that the Goldstein approach is inconsis-
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B. Debt-Financed Acquisitions
The sham doctrine is particularly important in the context of
debt-financed acquisitions. Generally, when a businessman
purchases an asset, he is anxious to negotiate the price downward.
However, the same businessman might very well be inclined to
negotiate the purchase price upward when the payment terms
include the delivery of a note. This anomaly is engendered by a
confluence of two factors: 1) high interest rates, and 2) high tax
brackets.5 1
For example, assume that a taxpayer who is in a 70% income
tax bracket 52 is about to purchase an asset, having a fair market
value of $100 and a useful life of five years, for $100 in cash. Obvi-
ously the taxpayer's basis with respect to this asset would be $100,
and the taxpayer would be able to enjoy depreciation deductions
(assuming no salvage value) throughout the five year useful life of
the asset in the aggregate amount of $100. What effect would be
created if the taxpayer were to offer to deliver to the seller, in ad-
dition to $100 in cash, a recourse note in the amount of $100, paya-
ble, without interest, ten years from the date of purchase? If the
taxpayer were permitted to include the amount of the note in his
basis computation, he would realize a greater profit53 from the
transaction than if he had only paid, as the purchase price, $100 in
cash; this would be true even if the taxpayer is compelled to make
full payment on the note. Assuming that the taxpayer deducts as
depreciation 20% of basis in each year of the five year life of the
tent with Knetsch itself, with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of Knetsch in Bridges, 325
F.2d 180, and with the reading of Knetsch recently expressed by the Tax Court. See Brad-
dock, 75 T.C. 324. Moreover, the viability of this approach, in light of Frank Lyon, is cer-
tainly questionable.
Finally, as a matter of policy, a taxpayer who, without any non-tax objective, enters into
a transaction that is devoid of economic substance should not be permitted to enjoy the tax
benefit inherent therein. See text & accompanying notes 127-28 infra.
51. See McKee, The Real Estate Tax Shelter: A Computerized Expose, 57 VA. L. Rxv.
521 (1971).
52. Of course, commencing with taxable years beginning in 1982, the maximum tax
bracket has been reduced to 50%. I.R.C. § 1, as amended by the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981, § 101(a). It should be noted, however, that a dollar of investment in 1982 or
later may nevertheless generate more than 50 cents of tax savings by virtue of the avail-
ability of tax credits.
53. It should be noted that if the note were interest bearing, this profit would diminish
and I.R.C. § 265 might well have application. On the other hand, if the investment tax
credit were applicable, this profit would increase.
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asset and assuming that tax-free investments are available at an
interest rate of 10%, the taxpayer would realize the following
amounts by virtue of the utilization of debt to "overpay" for the
asset:
TABLE I
Column I Column 2 Column 3
Additional depreciation Tax Interest
deduction generated by Savings income
virtue of the note" (70% of generated
Col. 1) by tax
savings"
Year 1 20 14
Year 2 20 14 1.40
Year 3 20 14 2.94
Year 4 20 14 4.63
Year 5 20 14 6.50
Year 6 8.55
Year 7 9.40
Year 8 10.34
Year 9 11.38
Year 10 12.51
TOTAL $100 $70 $67.65
In this example, the taxpayer would realize $137.65, the sum
of the tax savings ($70) and the interest income generated by the
tax savings ($67.65), by virtue of the addition of the note and its
inclusion in basis. Since the taxpayer, in year 10, is required to
discharge his $100 obligation on the note, the taxpayer would enjoy
54. Since depreciation is deducted at the rate of 20% of basis per year, the inclusion
of the $100 nonrecourse note in basis will generate a $20 deduction in each year of the five
year life.
55. This column contains the amounts of interest income that will be generated by
investing the tax savings (Column 2) in a 10% tax-free bond. It is assumed that no interest
income will be earned during year 1, inasmuch as the deduction will not generate any cash
savings until the filing of the tax return after the year's expiration. In year 2, however,
interest income in the amount of $1.40 will be earned with respect to the $14 of tax savings
generated in year 1. In year 3, interest income in the amount of $2.94 will be earned with
respect to the sum of tax savings generated in years 1 and 2 ($28) and the interest income
earned during year 2 ($1.40) will now also be available to earn interest. In effect, com-
pounding is assumed to be on an annual basis. In each succeeding year, interest is .similarly
computed by reference to the sum of the aggregate amount of savings generated in previous
years, and the aggregate amount of interest income earned in those years. As the foregoing
makes apparent, the obligation to pay tax during the course of the year on an estimated
basis is disregarded.
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an after-tax profit of $37.65 ($137.65-$100) by reason of paying
$100 more than requested for the asset. 6
If the note were nonrecourse, 5 the taxpayer might enjoy an
even greater profit.58 In year 10 he would have two options: If the
taxpayer were anxious to retain the asset, he would make the $100
payment on the nonrecourse note in which case he would realize
the same after-tax profit, $37.65, as if the note had been recourse.
If, on the other hand, the asset were no longer of sufficient value to
the taxpayer, he might well decide not to discharge the obligation
and would therefore forfeit the asset in which case the taxpayer
would enjoy an after-tax profit in excess of $37.65."9 In sum, the
taxpayer would realize an after-tax profit of at least $37.65, and
perhaps even more, by increasing the purchase price $100.
With a full appreciation of the tax consequences of such an
increase in purchase price, a prudent businessman would certainly
be inclined to add a substantial note to the purchase price of
56. An additional benefit inherent in this arrangement is that, by reason of inflation,
the payment of $100 in year 10 will be made with cheaper dollars than the dollars generated
in earlier years by the tax savings and related investment income attributable to the
overpayment.
57. For a discussion of the benefits of leverage inherent in such a note, see Young, The
Role of Motive in Evaluating Tax-Sheltered Investments, 22 TAX LAW. 275 (1969).
58. I.R.C. § 465, if applicable, would certainly act as a limitation with respect to depre-
ciation deductions engendered by the inclusion of the nonrecourse note in basis. It is as-
sumed here, however, that § 465 is inapplicable, either because the asset purchased is real
property or the transaction occurred prior to the enactment of § 465. It should also be em-
phasized that the basis computation remains significant, in the investment tax credit con-
text, despite the enactment of § 465. Treas. Reg. § 1.46-3(c)(1) (1979). For example, if the
nonrecourse note is included in basis in the hypothetical posited here, the investment tax
credit, which is equal to 10% of the basis, would be equal to $20, even though the taxpayer
is only at risk for $100. But see note 2 supra.
59. If the taxpayer were to abandon the property and not discharge the note, a tax
liability in the amount of $70 would be generated in year 10, the year of abandonment; the
amount realized would be $100, which is the amount of the liability (see Millar v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978); Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
970. (1980); Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Amount Realized: The Demise of Crane's
Footnote 37, 59 OREGON L. REv. 3 (1980)), and the basis would be zero. But see Tufts v.
Commissioner, - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1981), where the court held that nonrecourse debt is in-
cluded in amount realized only to the extent of the fair market value of the encumbered
asset. The tax liability of $70 is computed on the assumptions that the entire $100 gain is
ordinary income (recapture) and the taxpayer is in the 70% tax bracket in year 10. Thus, if
the taxpayer were to abandon the property, he would realize an after-tax profit of $67.65 by
virtue of the addition of the nonrecourse note- $137.65 of tax savings and interest less the
tax liability of $70 in year 10. If the note were excluded from computation by virtue of
either the likelihood-of-payment rationale or the sham doctrine, the note could similarly be
excluded from amount realized upon foreclosure. Trees. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(3) (1980).
1981] RE-EXAMINING THE SHAM DOCTRINE
most 0 of the assets that he acquires.61 The crucial question posed
by this arrangement is whether the note constitutes a sham and
therefore should be disregarded for tax purposes. The resolution of
this question should turn, in large part, upon whether the purchase
price is in excess of the fair market value of the asset to be ac-
quired; for if the purchase price of an asset is equal to its fair mar-
ket value, sufficient business motivation is present to avert invoca-
tion of the sham doctrine. That is not to say, however, that a sham
transaction is present whenever the purchase price of an asset ex-
ceeds its fair market value; in this circumstance, further inquiry is
necessary in order to determine the propriety of invoking the sham
doctrine.2
C. Why Overpay?
A taxpayer's willingness to pay more for an asset than its fair
market value is explainable on one of three grounds: 1) the tax-
payer mistakenly assumes that the fair market value is equal to
the purchase price; 2) the seller of the asset provides the taxpayer
with some benefit in addition to the asset; or 3) the taxpayer is
induced to effect the transaction by the tax-avoidance possibilities
presented.
60. Obviously, the acquisition of some assets, such as assets that are not depreciable,
would not be the appropriate subject for the addition of such a note, inasmuch as the basis
increase attributable to the note, in the case of the non-depreciable asset, would not gener-
ate any deductions.
61. Another variation on the concept of inflating purchase price in order to secure tax
reduction was recently addressed by the Internal Revenue Service in Rev. Rul. 81-149, 1981-
1 C.B. - (Internal Revenue Bulletin 1981-21, May 26, 1981). There, a corporate taxpayer
secured services for a fee of $20,000. One half of the fee was paid in cash, and the other half
was paid by the delivery of a 50-year note, bearing interest at 1.67% compounded monthly.
Interest and principal were required to be paid upon maturity of the 50-year note. Stating
that a service provider would not ordinarily accept a 50-year note in payment for its ser-
vices, the Service found that the "actual fee" for the services was limited to the amount of
the cash payment. Thus, since delivery of the 50-year note was motivated by tax-Teduction
purposes only, interest accruing thereon was held not to be deductible.
62. See Union Bank v. United States, 285 F.2d 126 (Ct. Cl. 1961), where the court
noted:
The fact that a purchaser of an asset pays more for it than it is worth does
not, of itself, convert the sale into something other than a sale, for tax purposes.
It may, at the most, suggest to a diligent tax collector that the transaction may
have other features which belie its appearance.
Id. at 128. Accord Narver v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 53 (1980), where the court stated: "[W]e
do not mean to imply that a sale will be disregarded for tax purposes merely because the
purchaser pays too much." Id. at 102.
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Whenever a taxpayer willingly pays more for an asset than its
fair market value solely in order to accomplish tax reduction, the
sham doctrine should preclude the taxpayer from enjoying a basis
in excess of the asset's fair market value.6s On the other hand,
where a taxpayer mistakenly pays more than fair market value for
an asset, the sham doctrine has no role to play, for the taxpayer is
motivated to pay the inflated purchase price by business or eco-
nomic objectives. In such a situation, the taxpayer's perception is
that the seller will not sell the asset for a lesser price and that
business realities compel him to pay the price requested. Finally, a
taxpayer who pays more than fair market value for an asset in or-
der to secure some additional benefit from the seller should not be
subjected to the sham doctrine since the taxpayer is motivated by
business or economic objectives; he is paying a fair consideration
for the asset and the other benefit he secures. However, an alloca-
tion will be required so that the taxpayer's basis for the asset pur-
chased will equal the portion of the consideration that is attributa-
ble to the asset. The portion of the consideration that is furnished
by the taxpayer in order to secure the additional benefit will, for
tax purposes, be reflected appropriately. 4
Superimposing these principles upon the hypothetical posed
previously yields the following analysis with respect to the appro-
priate tax treatment of the $100 recourse note. The taxpayer in the
hypothetical did not make any mistake concerning the fair market
value of the asset. Indeed, the seller offered to sell the asset for
$100 in cash, and the taxpayer responded by offering to pay $100
in cash and $100 in a note. Nor did the taxpayer receive any addi-
tional benefit from the seller that induced the addition of the note
to the purchase price. Thus, it is fair to conclude that the sole mo-
tivation for the taxpayer's introduction of the note was his desire
to obtain the after-tax profit of $37.65 generated by tax deductions
63. See, e.g., Morris v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 21 (1972); Bixby v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 757 (1972); Decon v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 829 (1976). See also text & accompanying
notes 126-202 infra.
64. If, for example, the taxpayer pays $200 for an asset that has a fair market value of
$100 in order to secure a service from the seller, the taxpayer would be entitled to a basis
with respect to the asset of $100 and would be entitled to a $100 deduction pursuant to
I.R.C. § 162 (assuming the requirements of this section are satisfied). If, on the other hand,
the taxpayer were to purchase such an asset (fair market value of $100) for $200 from his
son without receiving any additional benefit from his son, the taxpayer would be entitled to
a basis of $100 and would be deemed to have made a gift of $100.
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and interest income produced by the tax savings.6 5 Inasmuch as
the taxpayer added the note to the purchase price solely in order
to obtain this tax benefit, the sham doctrine requires that the note
be disregarded and that basis be limited to $100.
D. Equality of Consideration
The threshold question, in determining the applicability of the
sham doctrine in the basis computation context, is whether the
price exceeds the fair market value of the asset acquired; it is only
where such an excess is present that the sham doctrine is poten-
tially operative. The Tax Court, in Brountas v. Commissioner,66
recently confronted this question. In Brountas, a limited partner-
ship delivered cash and a nonrecourse note6 7 to an entity engaged
in the oil and gas business as an operator s in return for: 1) oil, gas
or mineral leasehold interests and 2) an agreement to drill a test
well. The partners sought to deduct their share of the partner-
ship's intangible drilling and development costs.6 9 One of the con-
tentions advanced by the Internal Revenue Service was that the
nonrecourse note was a sham and should, therefore, be disregarded
for tax purposes.7 0 The court, however, rejected the government's
65. As previously discussed (see text & accompanying notes 54-60 supra), the taxpayer,
in the nonrecourse context, might obtain an even greater after-tax profit if he decides not to
discharge the obligation.
66. 73 T.C. 491 (1979).
67. The partnership borrowed cash from the operator on a nonrecourse basis. Then, the
partnership redelivered the borrowed cash to the operator in payment for the leasehold in-
terests and the agreement to drill. The court concluded that this borrowing and repayment
format had no substance; in essence, the partnership delivered cash and a nonrecourse note
in order to obtain the leasehold interest and the agreement to drill. 73 T.C. at 533.
68. The court defined operator as follows:
An operator is an entrepreneur who attempts to locate and obtain oil and gas
prospects. Initially, an operator's geological staff searches for geographical areas
beneath the surface of which may'exist oil and gas reserves in commercial quan-
tities. These areas are called prospects. The operator then attempts to obtain
leasehold rights to these mineral interests by negotiating with either the land-
owner or other owners of the mineral rights. Once the operator has obtained the
mineral leasehold rights, and has decided to drill on the prospect, the operator
usually attempts to bring in venture capital partners for the drilling.
73 T.C. at 495.
69. I.R.C. § 263(c) and Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (1965) authorize an election to currently
deduct such costs.
70. If the nonrecourse note had been a sham, a disallowance of the intangible drilling
and development deduction would have been appropriate, inasmuch as no "expenditure"
would have been "incurred," within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (1964). 73 T.C. at
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argument, concluding that the sham doctrine is inapplicable where
a taxpayer acquires an asset for a price that approximates fair
market value.
These transactions were carefully structured so that the entire package of
compensation which flowed from the investors to the operators was within a
reasonable range of commercial practice in light of the obligations which the
operators assumed. We conclude that one part of this package - the nonre-
course notes - cannot properly be picked out of these transactions and be
labeled a sham, as that piece provided a necessary part of the consideration
which the operators received. To be sure, CRC [the general partner] struc-
tured those arrangements to provide tax shelter, and intended that the non-
recourse notes would yield benefits to the investors in the limited partner-
ships, but there were sound economic reasons for the use of such obligations
in these transactions. 71
In another portion of its opinion, the court stressed the pres-
ence of arm's-length negotiations:
We have found, contrary to respondents' contention, that the nonrecourse
notes which the investors gave to the operators had economic significance and
were a bona fide and bargained for part of these transactions. These transac-
tions were integrated wholes. The specific bundle of rights which each opera-
tor received was arrived at through arm's-length negotiations between the op-
erators and CRC [the general partner], and the terms of the resulting
contractual agreements were within a reasonable range of commercial
practice. 7
2
The inclusion of arm's-length negotiation as a pertinent factor in
the court's analysis does not alter the basic notion that the sham
doctrine is inapplicable whenever a taxpayer acquires an asset at a
price that is approximately equivalent to its fair market value. 3 In
576. An additional consequence of invoking the sham doctrine would have been a reduced
basis for each of the partners with respect to their partnership interest, since disregarding
the nonrecourse note would have prevented application of I.R.C. § 752(a). This section au-
thorizes, in effect, an increase in a partner's basis in his partnership interest in an amount
equal to his proportionate share of the increase in partnership liabilities. Inasmuch as a
partner may not deduct, as his share of partnership loss, an amount in excess of his basis in
his partnership interest (I.R.C. § 704(d)), characterization of the nonrecourse note as a sham
would have, in effect, reduced the amount of proportionate loss available as a deduction to
each partner.
71. 73 T.C. at 545.
72. 73 T.C. at 540-41.
73. But see Collins v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1656 (1970), where the court applied the
sham doctrine even though the value of the consideration package given by the taxpayer to
the seller was equal to the value of the asset the taxpayer received in the transaction. The
court held that the amount labelled by the taxpayer as prepaid interest was, in substance, a
part of the purchase price - not deductible as interest and presumably includible in basis.
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fact, in other contexts, it has been held that where fair market
value is selected as the purchase price, the parties to the transac-
tion are deemed to be acting at arm's-length even though they are
related.7 4 Thus, the court's conclusion that the purchase price,
which consisted of cash and a nonrecourse note, was approximately
equivalent 5 to fair market value, was determinative - the court's
observation concerning the presence of arm's-length negotiation,
properly viewed, was merely an inference derived from its conclu-
sion relating to fair market value equivalency.
In making its analysis as to the equivalency of fair market
value and purchase price, the court indicated that it was not neces-
sary for it to consider whether the sum of the cash and the face
amount of the nonrecourse note delivered to the operator by the
partnership exceeded the fair market value of assets or rights ac-
quired from the operator.76 In the court's view, so long as cash plus
the fair market value of the nonrecourse note approximately equals
the fair market value of assets or rights acquired by the partner-
ship, the sham doctrine in inapplicable. In other words, when
making the equivalency analysis in order to determine the propri-
ety of invoking the sham doctrine, the fair market value,78 and not
the face amount, of the nonrecourse note must be taken into
In the author's view, the court's recharacterization of the prepaid interest, although explic-
itly premised on the sham doctrine, is only supportable on a substance over form theory.
The court's failure to discern the differences between these doctrines is, perhaps, under-
standable, inasmuch as commentators suggest that the substance over form doctrine and the
sham (or business purpose) doctrine are frequently difficult to distinguish and occasionally
confused by the courts. See Bittker, Persuasive Judicial Doctrines in the Construction of
the Internal Revenue Code, 21 HOWARD L.J. 693, 722 (1978); Rice, supra note 37, at 1041-
48; Note, The Business Purpose Doctrine: The Effect of Motive on Federal Income Tax
Liability, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1078, 1080 (1981).
74. See King v. United States, 545 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1976).
75. The equivalence need not be exact. Provided that the purchase price is within a
"range of reason," the sham doctrine is inapplicable. Curry v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 667,
694 (1965); Royal Farms Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 172, 185 (1963).
76. The court stated:
In order to decide the sham issue, we did not need to go farther and decide
whether, as petitioners contend and numerous witnesses testified, the 150-per-
cent markup for the no-out turnkey obligation [the operator's profit element
with respect to the agreement to drill] would have been commercially fair if rep-
resented by cash rather than a contingent obligation [the nonrecourse note].
73 T.C. at 541-42, n.48.
77. Id. at 541-42.
78. Of course, a determination of the note's fair market value will be a function of the
note's contingent nature.
1981]-
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For example, assume that a taxpayer purchases an asset with a
fair market value of $150 by delivering cash of $100 and a nonre-
course note with a face amount of $75. If, after taking into account
the fact that the taxpayer is not legally obligated to discharge the
debt, it is determined that the note has a fair market value of not
more than $50, the note's validity should be sustained. The ratio-
nale for focusing on the fair market value of the note, rather than
its face amount is that the note is only economically significant to
the seller to the extent of its fair market value. That is, the seller,
in this hypothetical, would be anxious to make certain that he re-
ceive a package of consideration with a fair market value at least
equal to the fair market value of the asset being sold. Thus, if it is
assumed that the fair market value of the $75 nonrecourse note,
after taking into account its contingent nature, is $50, it is appar-
ent that the seller would refuse to sell his $150 asset for any
amount less than the $100 in cash and the $75 nonrecourse note.
The taxpayer's willingness to provide the seller with this consider-
ation package is obviously motivated by business objectives - a
reduction in the amount of the consideration package offered by
the taxpayer would precipitate a forfeiture of the opportunity to
acquire the asset. By virtue of the equality of the fair market value
of consideration exchanged by the taxpayer and the seller, the
sham doctrine is inapplicable.8°
79. See Gyro Engineering Corp. v. United States, 417 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1969), where
the court indicated that the terms of payment should be taken into account in determining
whether or not an overpayment is present.
80. This analysis, which focuses on the fair market value of the consideration package,
rather than the face amount, has, recently been adopted by the Internal Revenue Service in
Rev. Rul. 79-432, 1979-2 C.B. 289. There, the taxpayer purchased an art tax shelter for
$200,000 - $30,000 in cash and a $170,000 nonrecourse note (although the note was in form
partially recourse, the Service concluded that a limitation upon the obligee's rights in the
event of default required, as a matter of substance, a nonrecourse characterization). Though
the shelter's promoter provided two appraisals to the effect that the fair market value of the
shelter's estimated revenues approximated $200,000, the Service concluded that the fair
market value of the assets acquired from the promoter was only $30,000. In determining
that the $170,000 note was not properly includible in basis, the Service relied on its finding
that the value of the consideration package supplied by the taxpayer exceeded the value of
the assets acquired:
[T]he liability created by a nonrecourse note given as a part of the purchase
price of property cannot be included in the basis of the property where the value
of the property cannot be shown at least to approximate the value of the consid-
eration, including the amount of the note.
[Vol. 30
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E. Discount: Interest or Includible in Basis?
In those cases where equality of consideration is present, the
focus of the inquiry must shift to the computation of basis. Stated
in terms of the hypothetical under examination, the crucial ques-
tion is whether the taxpayer's basis for the asset acquired is $150,
the fair market value of the consideration package delivered to the
seller, or $175, the sum of the cash and the face amount of the
note. While the resolution of this question remains unclear,81 it is
suggested that the taxpayer's basis should be $150. Assuming this
position is correct, what is the appropriate characterization of the
$25 difference between the $150 basis and the $175 amount the
taxpayer will actually be required to pay in order to retain the as-
set? Since the seller would obviously have accepted $150 cash in
payment for the asset, instead of $175 on a deferred basis, the $25
difference between cash price and deferred price represents com-
pensation to the seller for the use of his capital. As such, this $25
differential should be characterized as interest, for which a deduc-
tion should be available to the taxpayer 2 in the taxable year for
Id. at 291 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
The ruling is also noteworthy for its assertion that:
It is readily apparent that if the items purchased from the sales promotion cor-
poration had a fair market value approaching $200,000, the sales promotion cor-
poration would not have made such items available for sale to the public on the
highly speculative terms described above.
Id. at 290.
Thus, it would appear that, in the Service's view, the presence of a nonrecourse note
can in itself imply that the note's fair market value is less than its face amount. See note 11
supra. Such an implication, while perhaps tippropriate in the context of the ruling's facts, is
not a universal truth. For example, if a taxpayer were to purchase an asset (having a fair
market value of $100) for $99 in cash and a nonrecourse note with a face amount of $1,
bearing interest at a reasonable rate, one could not reasonably argue that the fair market
value of the asset is less than $100.
81. See Simmons, supra note 4, at 28.
82. The Supreme Court, in Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Mill Co.,
417 U.S. 134 (1974), indicated that, in determining whether or not an item constitutes inter-
est within the meaning of I.R.C. § 163, "the relevant inquiry in each case must be whether
the issuer-taxpayer has incurred, as a result of the transaction, some cost or expense of
acquiring the use of capital." Id. at 147. Moreover, in United States v. Midland-Ross Corp.,
381 U.S. 54 (1965), the Supreme Court made the following observation with respect to dis-
count - the difference between the face amount of an obligation and the cash received
therefor: "this Court has often recognized the economic function of discount as interest." Id.
at 66 (footnote omitted). See Gyro Engineering Corp. v. United States, 417 F.2d 437 (9th
Cir. 1969); Roemer v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 440, 461 (1977), aff'd, Holgerson v. Commis-
sioner, 638 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1981). But see Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340 (1966);
Kingsford Co. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 646, 659 (1964).
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which it is paid or incurred, s and should not be included in
basis."'
The characterization of this $25 difference as interest is con-
sistent with the Internal Revenue Service's initial announcement
on the subject. In Treasury Office Decision 959,8 an individual
taxpayer purchased an asset by delivering a note to the seller. The
fair market value *of the asset purchased was less than the face
amount of the note. The Service held that: 1) the difference be-
tween the face amount of the note and the fair market value of the
asset acquired constituted discount, deductible as interest during
the life of the note; and 2) the basis of the asset acquired by the
taxpayer was equal to the asset's fair market value.
Although the conclusions reached in the Treasury Office Deci-
sion seem to reflect the economic reality of discount as interest,
properly precluding the inclusion of such discount in the basis of
the asset acquired, the Internal Revenue Service has maintained a
contrary position in the courts. For example, in American Smelt-
ing & Refining Co. v. United States,"8 the Service argued that the
concept of discount and, impliedly, the principles inherent in the
concept - deductible interest and omission of the discount from
the basis computation 7 - are not applicable unless the note or
obligation is issued for cash.88 The Supreme Court, observing a
83. I.R.C. § 461.
84. It must be noted that at least in the context of nonrecourse debt, the Treasury will
be adversely affected by this approach. The effect of recognizing the discount as interest
deductible over the life of the debt, and, therefore, omitting it from the basis computation,
in the context of a nonrecourse debt that is not contingent (see note 18 supra), is to prevent
the depreciation of the discount over the useful life of the asset - instead, the discount
must be deducted over the life of the debt which may be shorter, but certainly not longer,
than the useful life of the asset. The Treasury, however, will enjoy offsetting revenue by
virtue of the inapplicability of the investment tax credit with respect to discount that is
treated as interest.
85. 4 C.B. 129 (1921).
86. 130 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1942).
87. Those courts that have held that the difference between the face amount of an
obligation and the fair market value of the asset acquired therefor does not constitute dis-
count (deductible interest) have done so on the rationale that the basis of the asset acquired
should equal the face amount of the obligation - any gain or loss arising from the issuance
of the obligation in exchange for the asset should be recognized upon the sale or exchange of
the asset. See, e.g., Montana Power Co. v. United States, 232 F.2d 541 (3d Cir., en banc,
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956); Dodge Bros., Inc. v. United States, 118 F.2d 95 (4th
Cir. 1941); Sacramento Medico Dental Building Co. v. Commissioner, 47 BTA 315 (1942);
Sam H. Harris Theatrical Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 308 (1943).
88. See 130 F.2d at 885.
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conflict in the lower courts,"" found it unnecessary to decide this
question: "[T]his Court has never decided the question whether
discount may result when debt obligations are issued in exchange
for property other than cash. Those courts that have passed upon
the issue have reached opposing conclusions." 90
While the Internal Revenue Service has vacillated and the Su-
preme Court has not decided the question, it is suggested that the
preferable view is that discount be treated, in accordance with eco-
nomic reality, as interest91 and thus be excluded from the basis
computation.2
89. Compare Nassau Lens Co. v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1962) and Ameri-
can Smelting and Refining Co. v. United States, 130 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1942) with Southern
Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222, 188 Ct. Cl. 302 (Ct. Cl. 1969) and Montana
Power Co. v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 620, 159 F. Supp. 593, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 842
(1958).
90. Commissioner v. National Alfafa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 146
(1974) (citations omitted).
91. Holding that discount must be recognized for tax purposes as such, even where it is
created in the context of the exchange of a note or obligation for an asset other than cash,
Mr. Justice Marshall (then Circuit Judge Marshall), in Nassau Lens Co. v. Commissioner,
308 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1962), said:
It may well be true that to a "borrowing buyer" interest or discount payments
seem part of the cost of the property. In reality, however, they are the cost of
using the money which is needed to purchase the property, a cost not incurred
by the buyer with ready cash. This distinction is clearly recognized by the Code,
and we feel we must give effect to it. Surely a promise today to pay $150,000 in
ten years is not presently worth $150,000 either in property or cash. And since
the debentures here could be redeemed at various times for various amounts, the
cost of the property could not be determined until the redemption and that
might not occur until long after the property had been resold. The contention
asserted is merely that when a seller also becomes a financing medium by taking
bonds issued at a discount instead of cash in exchange for property, the tax laws
will not recognize a charge for the use of money. We find no support for such an
assertion and we reject it.
Id. at 44 (footnote and citation omitted).
92. It must be noted that Congress' perception of discount, prior to the enactment of
I.R.C. § 483, may be viewed as inconsistent with the resolution suggested here. In explaining
the need for the enactment of § 483, the Senate Finance Committee indicated its under-
standing of the treatment of discount under the then existing law:
(a) Present law.- Under present law, an individual may sell a capital asset on
the installment basis without making any specific provisions for interest pay-
ments on installments .... The buyer takes as a basis for the property the total
sales price paid. For exaniple, an individual taxpayer might sell a capital asset
worth $1,000 for $1,300 payable over 10 years .... From the buyer's standpoint,
the $300, if treated as part of the price of the property would be added to the
basis of the property and, in the case of depreciable property be recoverable over
the life of the property. He might also, if the property qualified, be eligible for
an investment credit with respect to this $300. On the other hand, if this $300
122 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30
F. Inequality: The Basis Computation
Where market value equivalency exists, the sham doctrine is
were treated as interest, he could receive an interest deduction for this amount.
(b) General reasons for provision.- Your committee agrees with the House that
there is no reason for not reporting amounts as interest income merely because
the seller and purchaser did not specifically provide for interest payments.
S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 101, reprinted in (1964) U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEWS
1673, 1774.
It must be emphasized that this explanation of the status of the law, as in existence prior
to the enactment of § 483, is entitled to little weight, for it is nothing more than an ap-
praisal by a subsequent Congress of an intent that was entertained by an earlier one. See
Theodore H. Davies & Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 443 (1980); United Telecommunica-
tions, Inc., v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 278, 287 (1975), af'd, 589 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1978). In
fact, as indicated in text, the proper treatment of discount had never been resolved by the
Supreme Court.
The Committee on Ways and Means explained its view of the impact of § 483 upon a
taxpayer who purchases property by issuing a note or obligation:
Section 483(a) provides the general rule that part of each payment (under a con-
tract for the sale or exchange of property) to which section 483 applies is to be
treated as interest for all purposes of the code. The tax treatment of both the
purchaser and the seller may be affected by the rules of Section 483. Thus, the
basis of property in the hands of a purchaser does not include that part of his
payments under the contract which is treated as interest under Section 483 and
he is entitled to interest deductions for such part in accordance with his method
of accounting.
H. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. A84, reprinted in (1963) U.S. CODE CONO. & AD.
NEWS 1313, 1510. Thus, one might conclude that any debt-financed purchase that is subject
to the provision of § 483 will result in a basis equal to the face amount of the debt, regard-
less of the value of the asset acquired, unless § 483 requires a recharacterization of a portion
of the face amount as interest. If such a recharacterization is required, the basis of the
property would be equal to the face amount of the debt less the amount of interest so
recharacterized.
This, however, may be too broad a view of the section. The section is not applicable
where a sufficient rate of interest is agreeed to by the purchaser and seller. See Treas. Reg. §
1.483-1 (1981). In such a situation, the computation of the purchaser's basis would seem to
be unaffected by § 483 principles. This conclusion seems appropriate in light of the fact that
§ 483 was enacted in order to prevent purchasers and sellers from selecting too low a rate of
interest. When, however, a sufficient rate of interest is selected by the purchaser and seller,
it is arguable that § 483 should not preclude the contention that even more interest is inher-
ent in the transaction in the form of discount. In sum, it is suggested that § 483 may have
the effect of creating a floor - a minimum rate of interest must be selected by the pur-
chaser and seller or the section will impute it - but not a ceiling - the parties may be free
to argue that discount is present such that the true amount of interest exceeds the rate
explicitly selected.
Perhaps, this approach to § 483 is even applicable where the parties provide for no inter-
est. In such circumstances, § 483 principles will impute a minimum amount of interest.
Imputing a minimum amount of interest, however, should not preclude the argument that
even more interest is present in the form of discount.
The computation of basis, in this context, is not conclusively resolved by § 483. Nonethe-
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inapposite. Inequality, on the other hand, does not always require
application of the doctrine. As previously suggested, a taxpayer
might agree to pay more for an asset than its fair market value by
virtue of: 1) a mistake; 2) a desire to obtain some additional bene-
fit or asset from the seller; or 3) a desire to obtain tax reduction.
The sham doctrine is only operative where tax reduction is the sole
motive for the overpayment.
1. Mistake
While there is a paucity of authority on the question of mis-
taken overpayment, those courts that have addressed the question
have concluded that the taxpayer should not be penalized for such
inadventure.9 3
In Hedges v. Commissioner,9" the taxpayer was a member of a
partnership engaged in drilling and developing oil and gas wells.
The partnership entered into an agreement with a drilling contrac-
tor, pursuant to which the drilling contractor agreed to drill wells
for the partnership for a fixed sum. The drilling contractor then
arranged to have a subcontractor drill the wells for the partnership
at a price below the fixed sum paid by the partnership.9 5 The tax-
less, one might well argue, referring to the Senate Finance Committee report on § 483, that
discount should not be recognized - basis should always equal purchase price irrespective
of the asset's fair market value - unless § 483 applies, in which case interest should be
imputed only to the extent provided for in the section. Interestingly, Congress adopted this
position by refusing, as a general rule, to acknowledge the discount concept insofar as the
seller is concerned where the buyer is a corporation. I.R.C. § 1232(b)(2) and Treas. Reg. §
1.1232-3(b)(2)(iii)(a) (1971).
While it would be administratively convenient to compute, in all cases, imputed interest
at the rate provided for under § 483 and thereby preclude taxpayers and the Service from
arguing that discount in addition to such imputed interest is present, debt-financed acquisi-
tions that are structured on the basis of discount computed at an interest rate higher than
that utilized under § 483 would provide taxpayers, where applicable, with an inflated invest-
ment tax credit base. In such circumstances, some portion of the discount would be included
in basis. This would be a particularly difficult problem in the context of nonrecourse debt,
where the contingent nature of the debt generally results in an interest rate higher than that
utilized under § 483, which is designed to apply to all kinds of debt. Perhaps, if different
interest rates were applied in imputing interest under § 483 to recourse and nonrecourse
debt, administrative convenience would dictate that § 483 principles be the exclusive deter-
minant of the discount question.
93. See Commissioner v. Matheson, 82 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1936); Spitcaufski v. Commis-
sioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 32 (1954).
94. 41 T.C. 695 (1964).
95. With respect to each well, the fixed sum paid by the partnership to the drilling
contractor and the lower amount paid by the drilling contractor to the subcontractor were
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payer deducted his share of the partnership's intangible drilling
and development costs.96 The deduction claimed on the partner-
ship return was equal to the fixed sum paid to the drilling contrac-
tor by the partnership. The Internal Revenue Service, alluding to
the substantially lower sum paid by the drilling contractor to the
subcontractor, disallowed that portion of the intangible drilling
and development cost that exceeded the amount paid by the drill-
ing contractor to the subcontractor.9 7 In essence, the Internal Rev-
enue Service's position was that the partnership had overpaid the
drilling contractor and that the amount of overpayment should not
be treated as a drilling cost.
The Tax Court, however, concluded that the entire amount
paid to the drilling contractor, including that portion characterized
by the government as an overpayment, should be treated as a de-
ductible drilling expense.98 Apparently, the court was reluctant to
disregard the price agreed upon, though foolishly, by the taxpayer.
Subsequent to its decision in Hedges, the Tax Court, in Bernuth v.
Commissioner,s" discussed this reluctance:
Where a taxpayer enters into a contract for the drilling of a well, and through
inexperience or otherwise, agrees to pay too much when compared to the "go-
ing rate" for the drilling of a well in a given field, the amount so agreed upon
is not any less the cost to the taxpayer of drilling the well. Under such cir-
cumstances, this court will not look behind the agreement of the parties and
as follows:
Fixed sum Lower amount paid
paid to by drilling contractor
drilling contractor to subcontractor
Well #1 $18,850 $11,974.50
Well #2 18,850 11,466.00
Well #3 16,000
Well #4 16,000 24,313.50
Well #5 16,000 12,454.22
Id. at 697.
96. A taxpayer may elect to either deduct such costs currently or capitalize them. I.R.C.
§ 263(c) and Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (1965).
97. 41 T.C. at 698.
98. While Hedges involved the propriety of a deduction in the context of the overpay-
ment of a currently deductible expense, the same analysis should obtain where basis compu-
tation is in issue. Indeed, the overpayment in the context of intangible drilling expense in
Hedges would have been capitalized had the taxpayer so elected. Presumably, such an elec-
tion would not have altered the court's analysis.
99. 57 T.C. 225 (1971), afl'd, 470 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1972).
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determine the amount allowable as a deduction for drilling costs in terms of
the going rate, and the amounts specified in the contract are determinative. 00
The deference with which the courts treat a price paid by a
taxpayer is not, however, without limitation. Where the inflated
purchase price results in the taxpayer's acquisition of some other
benefit or asset from the seller, or when the overpayment is moti-
vated solely by tax-avoidance objectives, the court will not defer to
the taxpayer's price selection. If no additional benefit or asset is
acquired from the seller, the taxpayer's state of mind is determina-
tive: If the overpayment is motivated solely by tax-avoidance
objectives, the sham doctrine prohibits the inclusion of the over-
payment in the basis computation. On the other hand, an overpay-
ment attributable to a genuine mistake is motivated by business
objectives - the taxpayer believes, though erroneously, that the
price is fair and that he cannot acquire the asset in the market-
place for a lesser amount - and is, therefore, properly included in
the computation. 10'
The policy consideration that underlies this treatment of mis-
take is the protection of a taxpayer who genuinely believes, at the
time of acquiring an asset, that the purchase price is equal to the
asset's fair market value against second-guessing by the Internal
Revenue Service or the courts. This approach also serves the salu-
tary purpose of extricating the courts from the burden of reviewing
the prudence exercised by taxpayers in their asset acquisitions. In
short, the principle advocated here - that mistaken overpayments
should be included in the basis computation - vests the exercise
of business judgement in the proper parties, the taxpayers rather
than the courts.102
Obviously aware of these considerations, the court in Estate of
Franklin v. Commissioner"'0 suggested that where an inquiry into
a taxpayer's state of mind discloses that genuine mistake, rather
than tax-avoidance objectives, has induced an overpayment, the
100. Id. at 236 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
101. Similarly, I.R.C. § 183 should not apply to a mistaken overpayment. See Jasionow-
ski v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 312 (1976), where the court adopted a subjective approach in
determining whether economic motivation exists; the expectation of profit need only be
"bona fide." Id. at 321. See also Dreicer v. Commissioner, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1981).
102. In other contexts as well, courts have refused to review the propriety of a litigant's
business judgment. See, e.g., Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 93 (1979).
103. 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
19811
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sham doctrine should not be applied.10 4 The Franklin court re-
solved the taxpayer's claimed entitlement to include a nonrecourse
debt in basis in favor of the government by implicitly applying the
likelihood-of-payment rationale. Utilization of the likelihood-of-
payment rationale, resulting in the debt's exclusion from basis, ob-
viated the need for consideration of the sham doctrine. 10 5 Never-
theless, the court did suggest that while the presence of a genuine
mistake has no significance in the context of the likelihood-of-pay-
ment rationale, such inadvertence should preclude invocation of
the sham doctrine.
104. See Estate of Franklin, where the court said:
[The taxpayers] spent a substantial amount of time at trial attempting to estab-
lish that, whatever the actual market value of the property, Associates [the part-
nership of which the taxpayers were members] acted in good faith belief that the
market value of the property approximated the selling price. However, this evi-
dence only goes to the issue of sham and does not supply substance [satisfy the
likelihood-of-payment rationale] to this transaction.
544 F.2d at 1048, n.4 (original emphasis). Interestingly, in suggesting that a genuine mistake
might preclude application of the sham doctrine, the court assumed that the determination
of whether or not such a mistake is present would be made at the partnership level. What
result would be appropriate if, while all of the limited partners have an inflated view of fair
market value, the general partner has an accurate view but fails to disabuse the limited
partners? Perhaps the knowledge of the general partner should be imputed to the partner.
ship (see UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 12) and the limited partners should be relegated to
the appropriate action against the general partner under the federal securities or state laws.
If, on the other hand, the partnership is viewed as an aggregate of its members (see, e.g.,
McKee, Partnership Allocations: The Need for an Entity Approach, 66 VA. L. REV. 1039
(1980)), one might argue that a fragmented basis should result - that portion of the part-
nership's basis in the acquired asset attributable to the general partner would be computed
by reference to the asset's fair market value, while the portion of such basis attributable to
the limited partners would be computed by reference to the inflated purchase price. Simi-
larly, each partner would be deemed to have contributed an amount of cash to the partner-
ship (for purposes of computing the basis of each partner in his partnership interest), pursu-
ant to I.R.C. § 752(a), equal to his share of the fragmented partnership liability incurred in
acquiring the asset - the portion of the liability attributable to the general partner would
not take into account the overpayment, while the entire amount of the liability attributable
to the limited partners would be taken into account. It must be conceded, however, that the
concept of fragmenting basis and liability is novel. See Honodel v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.
351 (1981). Cf. I.R.C. § 754, which creates a fragmented basis concept in another context.
See also, Goldfein & Weiss, An Analysis of the Proposed Changes Under Circular 230 Af-
fecting Tax Shelter Opinions, 53 J. TAx. 340, 346 (1980), where it is suggested that, at least
in the context of the fraud and negligence penalties (I.R.C. § 6653),, the wrongful conduct of
the general partners should not be imputed to the limited partners. For a contrary result, in
the general partnership context, see Calvey v. United States, 448 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1971).
105. In some situations, analysis of the sham doctrine may be necessary even though
the likelihood-of-payment rationale precludes inclusion of the nonrecourse note in basis. See
text accompanying notes 149-59 infra.
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This distinction between the sham doctrine and the likeli-
hood-of-payment rationale is a sensible one. Assume, for example,
that a taxpayer purchases an asset with a fair market value of $100
by delivering a nonrecourse note to the seller in the amount of
$200. In these circumstances, the likelihood-of-payment rationale
requires the conclusion that the nonrecourse note does not have
sufficient substance to be included in the basis computation, since
it would be improbable for a taxpayer to discharge a $200 obliga-
tion in order to retain an asset with a value of $100. Under this
analysis the taxpayer's basis would be zero, and there would be no
need to examine the sham doctrine. What result should obtain if
the taxpayer were to establish that at the time of acquiring the
asset, he honestly believed that the asset's fair market value was
$200? The conclusion that basis is zero should not be affected by
the taxpayer's mistake since the taxpayer's state of mind, at the
time of acquisition, does not increase the likelihood of payment.
To be sure, when the taxpayer learns of his mistake, at a point in
time after the acquisition documents are executed, he will, with
impunity, simply refuse to make payments on the note.106
This result is to be contrasted with the role of a mistaken
overpayment in the context of the sham doctrine. Assume, for ex-
ample, a taxpayer purchases an asset with a fair market value of
$100 by delivering $100 in cash and a $100 nonrecourse note, with
a value of $100, to the seller. Since the amount of the note is equal
to the asset's fair market value, there is sufficient inducement for
the taxpayer to discharge the note such that the likelihood-of-pay-
ment rationale does not preclude the inclusion of the note in basis.
The sham doctrine, however, is potentially applicable here. If the
taxpayer agrees to pay $200 ($100 in cash and $100 in note) for an
asset with a value of $100 solely in order to accomplish tax avoid-
ance, the sham doctrine will require disregard of that portion of
the purchase price that exceeds the asset's fair market value, thus
limiting the taxpayer's basis to $100, the fair market value of the
106. If, on the other hand, the taxpayer does not learn of his mistake prior to making
payments with respect to the note, such 'payments should be included in basis. Where a
nonrecourse note is not included in the basis computation by virtue of the likelihood-of-
payment rationale and payments are subsequently made in discharge of the note, such pay-
ments are added to basis. See Associated Patentees, Inc. v. Commisssioner, 4 T.C. 979
(1945). In addition, the sham doctrine should not apply to such payments, for, as suggested,
payments made by virtue of a mistaken assumption as to market value are motivated by
economic objectives rather than a desire to avoid tax obligations.
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asset.
If, on the other hand, the taxpayer genuinely believes the fair
market value of the asset to be $200, his basis should equal $200.
In these circumstances, the taxpayer is motivated by business
objectives to deliver the $100 in cash to the seller - it is the tax-
payer's perception that seller will not sell if he does not make this
cash payment. The taxpayer will also be motivated by business
objectives to make payments on the note, for a failure to make
such payments will result in forfeiture of the asset. Since the tax-
payer is motivated by business objectives to deliver the cash and
note, and since, even if the taxpayer learns of his mistake as to
value after executing the acquisition documents, the taxpayer will
be motivated to continue to make payments on the note by virtue
of his desire to retain the asset (certainly a business objective), the
sham doctrine should not apply.
The observation of the Franklin court that the taxpayer's mis-
take concerning value is not pertinent to the likelihood-of-payment
rationale is cogent. 10 7 The court's implicit observation that a mis-
107. It should be noted that, in the concluding paragraph of its decision, the court indi-
cated that "[b]ad bargains from the buyer's point of view . . . do not thereby cease to be
sales." Although the language should be viewed as having significance in the sham context
only, the court, in Hager v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 759 (1981), has construed it as a state-
ment that a buyer's bad bargain may affect the likelihood-of-payment analysis.
Moreover, while mistaken assumptions as to value should have no significance in the
context of the likelihood-of-payment analysis, such mistakes are relevant in connection with
the penalty provided for in I.R.C. § 6659 (effective with respect to tax returns required to be
filed after December 31, 1981), added by The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, §
722(a)(1). This section, which imposes a penalty on underpayments that result from an
overstated basis or an overstated valuation, empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to
waive its application if the excessive basis or valuation is supported by a reasonable basis
and is claimed by the taxpayer in good faith. For example, assume a taxpayer purchases an
asset with a value of $100,000 by delivering to the seller a nonrecourse note in the amount of
$300,000 on the mistaken assumption that the asset has a value of $300,000. The taxpayer's
basis in the acquired asset should be zero, since the note, having an insufficient likelihood of
payment, should not be included in basis. If the taxpayer were, nevertheless, to claim on his
tax return a basis of $300,000, he would be potentially subject to the § 6659 penalty with
respect to the underpayment resulting from a reduction of basis to zero. The Secretary of
the Treasury, however, is permitted to waive this penalty, if he concludes that there was a
reasonable basis for the taxpayer's impression of value and that the taxpayer made the mis-
take in good faith.
Thus, while the taxpayer's mistake is not a predicate for relief insofar as his basis com-
putation is concerned, it may enable the taxpayer to avert the § 6659 penalty. This distinc-
tion between basis computation and penalty is sound. Although it is inappropriate to allow a
taxpayer to include in basis a nonrecourse note that, in all likelihood, he will not pay, it
seems rather harsh to subject a taxpayer to a penalty for delivering such a note when its
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taken overpayment should not activate the sham doctrine'08 is
equally persuasive.
2. Multi-Asset/Multi-Benefit Transactions
Where a buyer agrees to pay more than fair market value for
an asset and the overpayment is attributable to the buyer's mis-
take, the buyer's basis is equal to the purchase price selected by
the parties.109 In the absence of mistake, however, such inequality
will always precipitate a basis for the asset acquired that is less
than the purchase price. This effect results from either the opera-
tion of the sham doctrine or the doctrine that gives tax effect to
the realities of a transaction rather than the form selected by the
taxpayer.
Students of taxation are familiar with the principle that trans-
actions are treated, for tax purposes, in accordance with their sub-
delivery is the product of a good-faith mistake.
108. It must be conceded that some administrative convenience is inherent in this ap-
proach. The courts will be required to examine the taxpayer's state of mind in making the
mistake analysis. In addition, taxpayers will probably be encouraged to play the "audit lot-
tery" by taking the position on their tax return that all payments made in connection with
the acquisition of property should be included in basis without regard to the property's fair
market value. The rationale for such a position would presumably be that if an overpayment
is present, it is attributable to mistake. However, the alternative, penalizing the taxpayer for
his mistake, is certainly not preferable.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the reluctance of the courts to examine a tax-
payer's business acumen or exercise of business judgment is not limited to transactions in-
volving the principles of basis computation inherent in the sham doctrine. Indeed, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service itself has issued regulations in the gift tax context which protect sellers
who make mistakes as to valuation from adverse transfer tax consequences. Treas. Reg. §
25.2512-8 (1958). Such sales receive the protection of the regulations provided the sale is
made in the "ordinary course of business." Id. While, therefore, a taxpayer who sells an
asset for less than its fair market value by virtue of a mistake is entitled to impunity under
the regulations, a taxpayer who makes such a sale with full knowledge of the facts is subject
to the gift tax. In essence, the protection from the gift tax conferred upon sellers who mis-
takenly agree to sell for less than fair market value is the counterpart to the principle that
the sham doctrine does not prevent a buyer from including in his basis that portion of the
purchase price attributable to mistakes.
109. This conclusion should be altered, however, where a discount is present. See text
accompanying notes 81-92 supra. For example, if a taxpayer agrees to purchase an asset
with a value of $100 for $100 in cash and a nonrecourse note with a face amount of $75 and
a value of $50, under the mistaken impression that the asset has a value of $150, the tax-
payer's basis should equal $150; in addition, of course, an interest deduction in the amount
of $25 should be available in the appropriate taxable years. In this example, while the
purchase price selected by the parties is $175 (consisting of $100 in cash and $75 in note),
basis should only be $150, the amount the taxpayer mistakenly believes is the true value of
the asset.
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stance rather than the form in which they are cast by the tax-
payer.110 This tenet has been applied, in the context of an
acquisition of a group of assets, in order to determine whether the
amounts designated as the purchase price with respect to any par-
ticular asset in the acquisition documents represents, as a matter
of economic reality, the true cost of that asset.11 Basis will equal
the purchase price allocated in the acquisition documents only
when such economic reality is present. Conversely, where the
purchase price is incompatible with economic reality, courts will
determine basis in accordance with their perception of the asset's
true economic cost. In effect, when confronted with a multi-asset
transaction, courts will not allow a taxpayer to allocate basis to any
individual asset that is in excess of the asset's fair market value.112
Where a taxpayer acquires an asset for a purchase price that
exceeds the asset's fair market value, inquiry is necessary in order
to determine whether a multi-asset acquisition or other type of
multi-benefit transaction is present. If it is determined that the
taxpayer has acquired, in the same transaction, some other addi-
tional asset or benefit, the portion of the purchase price in excess
of the asset's fair market value should be attributed to the other
asset or benefit acquired in the transaction.
In New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co. v. Commissioner,11 3 the
taxpayer, an insurance company, sold its own stock in 1929 to
some of its agents at $60 per share. In 1936 the market value of the
taxpayer's stock was approximately $42 per share. Because of its
desire to maintain an appropriate attitude among its agents,114 the
taxpayer, in 1936, reacquired its stock from its agents for $57.75
per share.1 5 Shortly thereafter, the taxpayer sold the reacquired
stock for approximately $42 or $43 per share, claiming a loss for
110. See, e.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Commissioner v. Court Hold-
ing Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
111. See, e.g., F. & D. Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 335 (1965), where a tax-
payer purchased inventory and fixed assets. The acquisition documents allocated the
purchase price between the inventory and the fixed assets. The Internal Revenue Service
contended that the allocation contained in the acquisition documents was unrealistic-it
sought to increase the allocation with respect to fixed assets and decrease the allocation with
respect to inventory in the same amount. See also Rev. Rul. 79-432, 1979-2 C.B. 289.
112. See note 111 supra.
113. 2 T.C. 708 (1943).
114. Id. at 718.
115. The market value, at the time of reaquisition, "was about $42 or $43 per share."
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the difference between the sales price and the price it paid its
agents of $57.75 per share."' i The Internal Revenue Service dis-
allowed the loss on the rationale that the taxpayer's basis with re-
spect to the reacquired stock should not exceed the fair market
value of the stock on the date of reacquisition, $42 or $43 per
share.117 The Tax Court sustained the disallowance, reasoning that
the scope of the 1936 transaction between the taxpayer and its
agents extended beyond the reacquisition of stock.118 The taxpayer
was motivated, the court found, to pay more than fair market
value for the stock in order to "keep faith" with its agents. 1 '
The taxpayer's basis with respect to the reacquired stock was
limited to its fair market value on the date of reacquisition.1 20 Pre-
sumably, the difference between the stock's purchase price and its
fair market value on the date of reacquisition, being attributable to
the taxpayer's desire to "keep faith" with its agents, would be de-
ductible, in the year of reacquisition, as a business expense. 21 In
any event, the court's finding that the overpayment, with respect
to the stock acquisition, was motivated by the taxpayer's desire to
maintain a strong relationship with its agents precluded the inclu-
sion of the overpayment in the stock's basis.
In Majestic Securities Corporation v. Commissioner,22 the
corporate taxpayer purchased securities from another corporation.
Both the taxpayer and the corporation from which the securities
were acquired were owned substantially by the same shareholders,
though not in the same proportion. The purchase price for the se-
curities acquired was in excess of the price at which these securi-
116. I.R.C. § 1032, enacted in 1954, provides that a corporation does not recognize gain
or loss upon the sale of its own stock. Prior to 1954, however, it had been held that the sale
of treasury stock did result in gain or loss. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INcoME TAXA-
TION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 3-51 (1979).
117. 2 T.C. at 723-25.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. "Prices in excess of market paid for personal reasons are not the correct measure
of cost." Id. at 724 (citations omitted).
121. Inasmuch as the court disallowed the loss claimed by the taxpayer without discus-
sion of a possible business expense deduction, one might assume that the court was of the
view that no such deduction was appropriate. However, it is also possible that the court
concluded, albeit not explicitly, that such a deduction was unavailable by reason of public
policy concerns - generally, insurance companies are severely circumscribed, under state
law, from compensating their agents in excess of certain scheduled commission rates. For a
subsequent codification of this public policy theory, see I.R.C. § 162(c).
122. 42 B.T.A. 698 (1940), aff'd, 120 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1941).
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ties were trading on a stock exchange. When computing its gains
and losses upon the subsequent sale of these securities, the tax-
payer claimed a basis equal to purchase price. The government,
however, contended that the taxpayer's basis should be limited to
the fair market value of the securities on the date of purchase.
Agreeing with the government, the Board of Tax Appeals held
that the taxpayer failed to prove that "the amount paid was for no
purpose other than the acquisition of the securities.' 1 23 Before
reaching this conclusion, the court surmised that the purpose of
the overpayment was to provide funds to the corporation from
which the securities were acquired in order to maintain its sol-
vency.124 The court derived this inference from the fact that the
taxpayer and the seller of the securities were substantially owned
by the same parties.
In essence, the taxpayer accomplished two objectives when it
executed the purchase from the other corporation: 1) it obtained
the securities, and 2) it helped maintain the solvency of the seller.
The latter accomplishment, however, inured solely to the benefit of
the taxpayer's shareholders. Although the court did not address
this issue, it appears that the overpayment constituted a dividend
to the taxpayer's shareholders. 25 To be sure, however, the tax-
payer, having secured some benefit in addition to the securities in
the transaction, was properly prevented from including the over-
payment in basis.
Thus, a taxpayer who pays more than fair market value for an
asset in order to secure some additional asset or benefit should not
be permitted to reflect the entire purchase price in basis. Rather,
the taxpayer should be required to compute basis in accordance
with the economic realities of the transaction: The portion of the
purchase price attributable to the asset acquired constitutes basis,
and the balance of the purchase price, being attributable to the
acquisition of the additional asset or benefit, is characterized by
reference to the nature of the additional asset or benefit acquired.
3. Tax-Motivated Overpayments: Sham
In contrast to a mistaken overpayment or an overpayment mo-
123. Id. at 702.
124. Id. at 701.
125. See BITTKER & EUSTicE, supra note 116, at 7-27.
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tivated by a desire to obtain some additional asset or benefit -
both of which are motivated by economic objectives - an overpay-
ment that is motivated solely by tax avoidance objectives is viola-
tive of the sham doctrine. The courts have, on several occasions,
held that an overpayment motivated solely by a desire to inflate
basis or otherwise effect tax reduction is not to be given effect. The
Internal Revenue Service, as well, has begun to issue rulings that
implicitly address the relationship of the sham doctrine to such
overpayments.126
These rulings and decisions are supported by sound policy
objectives. It would make little sense to allow a taxpayer who ac-
quires an asset to include in his basis computation any amount in
excess of the asset's fair market value when the taxpayer, being
fully aware of the asset's value, requests that the seller inflate the
purchase price in order to accommodate the taxpayer's tax-avoid-
ance objectives. If transactions such as these were given respect for
tax purposes, the government would, in effect, be offering to re-
duce the tax bill of all taxpayers sufficiently sophisticated to create
the necessary artifice, at the expense of the remaining, less sophis-
ticated taxpayers. While the law does intentionally confer, in vari-
ous contexts, advantages upon wealthy and sophisticated taxpayers
that are not available to the remainder of the taxpaying popula-
tion, such provisions generally are designed to encourage behavior
that is beneficial to society.127 Obviously, Congress has decided
that the inequity inherent in such provisions must be suffered in
order to secure a more important goal. However, with respect to
the purchaser who intentionally pays more than market value for
an asset solely in order to inflate his basis, society is not at all
enriched and, thus, equity should be preserved by denying the tax-
payer the personal enrichment he seeks from an overstated basis.
Moreover, the important objective of securing compliance in our
self-assessment system of taxation is adversely affected when the
public perceives that special advantages are uniquely available to
126. See Rev. Rul. 79-432, 1979-2 C.B. 289; Rev. Rul. 80-42, 1980-1 C.B. 182.
127. For example, while I.R.C. § 170 renders $70 in tax reduction to a 70% taxpayer for
$100 of charitable contribution, it only produces $20 in tax reduction for a 20% taxpayer
with respect to the same amount of charitable contribution. This inequity is tolerated on
the rationale that it encourages charitable contributions. See Bittker, Charitable Contribu-
tions: Tax or Matching Grants, 28 TAx L. REv. 37 (1972); Levi, Financing Education and
the Effect of the Tax Laws, XXXIX LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 75 (1975).
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the wealthy and the sophisticated. 128
The Tax Court, in Mountain Wholesale Co. v. Commis-
sioner,1 29 obviously concerned about these policy objectives, in-
voked the sham doctrine in the basis computation context. There,
a corporation which was encountering financial difficulties sold its
receivables to the corporate taxpayer. Substantially all of the tax-
payer's stock was initially owned by the seller corporation. Upon
liquidation, the seller corporation distributed its stock in the tax-
payer to its shareholders - in effect, the shareholders of the seller
became, as a result of the liquidation, the taxpayer's shareholders.
The price agreed upon by the taxpayer and the seller for the re-
ceivables was equal to their face amount. The taxpayer paid the
purchase price by assuming a debt of the seller corporation. Upon
failing to collect the face amount of these receivables, the taxpayer
claimed a bad debt deduction. The government, however, argued
that the taxpayer's basis in the receivables was limited to their fair
market value at the time of acquisition and therefore the court
should sustain the disallowance of the deduction to the extent that
the face amount exceeded the fair market value of the
receivables.130
The court, noting that the receivables were from one to eight
years old at the time of the taxpayer's acquisition, agreed with the
government's contention that their fair market value was substan-
tially less than their face amount. Since the financial difficulties of
the seller corporation and its concomitant lack of income pre-
cluded it from enjoying the tax benefit inherent in a bad debt de-
duction, the court inferred that the only explanation for the tax-
payer's willingness to overpay was the desire to secure the bad
debt deduction for itself - a deduction that would obviously inure
to the ultimate benefit of the taxpayer's shareholders, who were
also substantial owners of the seller corporation, and which would
otherwise be forfeited. Having determined that the overpayment
128. Fabreka Products Co. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 290, 301-02 (1960) (concurring,
Pierce, J.). See, e.g., Blum, Tax Policy and Preferential Provisions in the Income Tax Base,
in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 1 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 77, 82 (1959); Roberts,
Friedman, Ginsburg, Louthan, Lubick, Young & Zeittlin, A Report on Complexity and the
Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REv. 325 (1972); Coven, The Alternative Minimum Tax: Proving
Again That Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1093 (1980).
129. 17 T.C. 870 (1951).
130. I.R.C. § 166 provides that a bad debt may be deducted to the extent of the tax-
payer's basis in the debt.
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was motivated solely by tax avoidance objectives, the court in-
voked the sham doctrine and consequently sustained the govern-
ment's disallowance."-' The court disregarded the taxpayer's over-
payment and held that its basis in the receivables was equal to
their fair market value at the time of acquisition.
The Tax Court again had occasion to invoke the sham doc-
trine in the basis computation context in Bixby v. Commis-
131. The taxpayer also purchased a warehouse from the other corporation at a purchase
price which, the court found, was in excess of fair market value. In limiting the taxpayer's
basis with respect to the warehouse to fair market value, the court did not explicitly rest its
holding, as it did with respect to the receivables, on the sham doctrine. Indeed, in one por-
tion of its opinion, 17 T.C. at 874-75, the court implied that it was of the view that the
overpayment was motivated by the taxpayer's desire to obtain some additional asset or ben-
efit. Perhaps, the court did not think it necessary to decide whether this motivation or the
desire to avoid tax was responsible for the overpayment on the warehouse, inasmuch as, in
either case, the taxpayer's basis for the warehouse would be equal to its fair market value.
Although the court did explicitly invoke the sham doctrine with respect to the receiv-
ables, one might argue that the court's basis computation for the receivables was also sup-
portable on the theory that the overpayment was motivated by the taxpayer's desire to
provide financial aid to the seller corporation-aid that inured to the benefit of the tax-
payer's shareholders. See text accompanying notes 123-25 supra. The blending of these two
concepts-overpayment motivated by tax avoidance objectives and overpayment motivated
by a desire to obtain some additional asset or benefit-is also illustrated in Investors Diver-
sified Services, Inc. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 294 (1962), af'd, 325 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1963).
There, the taxpayer supplied mortgage funds to purchasers of homes that were built by a
corporation that was wholly owned by the taxpayer. The fair market value of the mortgage
note received by the taxpayer was less than the amount of the funds supplied by the tax-
payer to the purchaser. It was the custom in the industry, with respect to the kinds of
mortgages involved, for the builder of the home to compensate the lender for the difference
between the fair market value of the mortgage note and the amount of funds supplied to the
purchaser. The taxpayer, however, owning all of the stock in the corporate builder, decided
to waive this compensation. When the taxpayer sold these mortgages, he claimed, as a basis,
the amount of funds it supplied to the purchasers. The government, on the other hand,
argued that the taxpayer's basis in the mortgages should be limited to their fair market
value at the time of their acquisition.
In agreeing with the government, the court noted that tax-avoidance considerations
played a role in the taxpayer's decision to forego compensation from the builder. Id. at 307.
However, the court resolved the issue on the basis of its conclusion that the overpayment
with respect to the mortgage was, in effect, a capital contribution by the taxpayer to the
builder. Id. at 308. Thus, the court's analysis appears to focus on the taxpayer's desire, in
making the overpayment, to acquire a benefit in addition to the mortgages-the benefit
inherent in making a capital contribution to a wholly owned subsidiary. An important by-
product of this analysis is that the taxpayer would presumably be permitted to increase its
basis in its stock in the subsidiary by virtue of the court's finding of a capital contribution,
whereas a finding of sham would probably dictate a less favorable result for the taxpayer.
Thus, the distinction between these two different types of overpayments is not always a
clear one.
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sioner. 32 A corporate taxpayer was contacted about the possibility
of purchasing an option to acquire the assets of another corpora-
tion. The taxpayer, interested in making the acquisition, caused
certain related trusts133 to purchase the option. While the cost in-
curred by the trusts in acquiring the option was only $63,500, the
trusts immediately resold the option to the taxpayer for
$1,641,526.75. Instead of paying cash for the option, the taxpayer
gave the trusts ten year subordinated debentures, which were re-
course in nature, in the face amount of $1,641,526.75. The tax-
payer, after exercising the option, claimed depreciation deductions
which were computed by reference to a basis that included the face
amount of the debentures. The government's argument, in essence,
was that the taxpayer should not be permitted to include the op-
tion price in the basis of the assets acquired to the extent that the
price of the option ($1,641,526.75) exceeded its fair market
value.1 3
4
Sustaining the government's position, the court invoked the
sham doctrine. In so doing, the court agreed with the government's
argument that the fair market value of the option was $63,500, the
price paid for the option by the trusts. The court was also of the
view that the overpayment was motivated solely by a desire to ac-
complish tax reduction.' These findings properly led the court to
its conclusion that the sham doctrine was applicable. 136 Accord-
132. 58 T.C. 757 (1972).
133. The beneficiaries of these trusts were substantially the same parties as the benefi-
ciaries of a trust which owned all of the taxpayer's stock. Id. at 759.
134. The government argued that the price of $63,500 paid by the trusts for the option
represented its fair market value. Id. at 774.
135. The court stated its findings as to the motivation for the overpayment: "[WIe are
convinced that the only reasons [the taxpayer] issued the notes were 1) to get the stepped-
up basis, 2) to obtain the interest deduction, and 3) perhaps to prepare for a future 'pay out'
of profits." Id. at 783-84. The first reason proferred by the court supports the sham conclu-
sion. However, the third reason is troublesome. Is the court suggesting, in its statement of
the third reason, that business objectives motivated the overpayment? If it is, its decision to
invoke the sham doctrine is difficult to rationalize. Perhaps the proper view of the third
reason is that it, too, represents a tax-avoidance objective-the taxpayer's desire to pass its
earnings to its shareholders on a tax-deductible basis. This perspective of the third state-
ment is confirmed by the court's reliance on the doctrine developed by the Second Circuit in
Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), to the effect that interest deduc-
tions are unavailable when the transaction that results in the interest obligation is moti-
vated solely by tax-avoidance objectives.
136. The court suggested that it was the taxpayer's decision to interpose the trusts be-
tween the corporation offering the option and itself, rather than the overpayment, that acti-
vated the sham doctrine. 58 T.C. at 777. In other portions of its opinion, however, the court
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ingly, the taxpayer's basis for the option was held to equal $63,500,
its fair market value, and, of course, the taxpayer was permitted to
include this amount in its basis for the assets acquired upon exer-
cise of the option.
The Tax Court also relied upon a finding of tax-avoidance mo-
tivation in order to prevent a taxpayer from inflating basis in Mor-
ris v. Commissioner,'-" a somewhat more difficult case. There, the
corporate taxpayer purchased a motel by taking subject to first
mortgage notes with an unpaid balance of $333,800 and second
mortgage notes with an unpaid balance of $173,962.67 (both the
first and second mortgage notes were nonrecourse in nature). The
taxpayer's stock was owned by two shareholders, a husband and
wife. The husband, as a part of the same transaction in which the
taxpayer purchased the motel, acquired the second mortgage notes
from their holder. The taxpayer computed its depreciation deduc-
tion by reference to a basis that included the amounts outstanding
on both the first and second mortgage notes.
The Tax Court determined that the fair market value of the
motel, at the time of acquisition, was $333,800.18 It then, in es-
sence, concluded that since the fair market value of the motel was
equal to the unpaid balance on the first mortgage notes, the second
mortgage notes represented an overpayment.3 9 In holding that
this overpayment was improperly included in the basis computa-
tion, the court noted that the second mortgage notes, which were
held by the party who owned and controlled the taxpayer,14 0 were
"solely a device to inflate the true cost of the property for tax pur-
poses."14' While this finding that the overpayment was motivated
solely by tax-avoidance objectives is suggestive of sham, an explicit
reference to the doctrine is conspicuously absent from the court's
alluded to those authorities that have invoked the sham doctrine in disregarding overpay-
ments motivated solely by tax-avoidance objectives. Id. at 776. Perhaps, disregard of the
interposition of the trusts, by reason of a complete lack of a business motivation for their
presence, is but another way of stating that the tax avoidance objectives that motivated the
overpayment engaged the sham doctrine.
137. 59 T.C. 21 (1972).
138. Id. at 31.
139. Id. at 33.
140. Although in one portion of its opinion the court indicated that the holder of the
debt was the party who owned and controlled the taxpayer (id. at 34) it should be noted
that the taxpayer was owned by a husband, who had acquired the second mortgage notes,
and his wife. Id. at 29.
141. 59 T.C. at 34.
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decision. Moreover, immediately following this finding, the court
cited Crane and, therefore, invoked the likelihood-of-payment ra-
tionale to support its holding that the liability on the second mort-
gage notes was not includible in the basis computation.
Did the court intend to invoke the likelihood-of-payment ra-
tionale or the sham doctrine? Inasmuch as the court permitted the
taxpayer to include the liability on the first mortgage notes in its
basis computation, it is improbable that the court's decision rested
on the likelihood-of-payment rationale; for when this rationale is
applied, the basis computation does not include any portion of the
nonrecourse liability.142 Indeed, had the court applied the likeli-
hood-of-payment rationale, it should have excluded the first mort-
gage notes as well as the second mortgage notes from basis: only an
imprudent taxpayer would have discharged any portion of either of
these notes (having an aggregate face amount substantially in ex-
cess of the value of the motel), since failure to fully discharge both
of these notes would inevitably result in a forfeiture of the motel.
Since the sham doctrine, on the other hand, only excludes from the
basis computation that portion of the liability that exceeds the as-
set's fair market value, 143 the court's holding is compatible with
this mode of analysis.
While the court appeared to contemplate the sham doctrine, it
would seem that the doctrine should not have been applied to the
mortgage notes.144 Inequality of consideration, an essential predi-
cate for application of the doctrine, was not present. Indeed, the
court found that the amount of the first mortgage notes was equal
to the value of the motel and that, consequently, the second mort-
gage notes were worthless.4 5 In effect, therefore, the value of the
consideration package delivered by the taxpayer to the seller -
the value of the first mortgage notes only, since the second mort-
142. See text & accompanying notes 14-29 supra.
143. There are, however, situations where application of the sham doctrine should re-
sult in a basis less than fair market value. See text accompanying notes 149-71 infra. In-
deed, it is arguable that Morris presents such a situation. See text accompanying notes 158-
60 infra.
144. This is not to suggest that the mortgage notes should have been included in basis.
See note 158 infra. Moreover, while the mortgage notes in themselves should not be viewed
as a sham, the transaction, examined in its entirety, may nevertheless be viewed as a total
sham, which will be suggested (see text & accompanying notes 158-60 infra), or a partial
sham (see text & accompanying notes 156-57 infra).
145. Since the amount of the first mortgage notes was equal to the value of the motel,
the second mortgage notes had, at most, nuisance value. 59 T.C. at 31.
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gage notes were worthless - was approximately equal to the value
of the motel, the consideration package received by the
taxpayer. 146
Given this perspective on inequality and the sham doctrine,
the doctrine will play a limited role with respect to a transaction
involving nonrecourse debt in excess of the fair market value of the
asset acquired. For example, if a taxpayer were to purchase an as-
set with a fair market value of $100 by delivering a $200 nonre-
course note to the seller, the equality of consideration should pre-
clude operation of the sham doctrine: the value of the asset
received by the taxpayer is $100; the value of the nonrecourse note
delivered by the taxpayer to the seller is also $100, by virtue of the
fact that, in the event of a foreclosure, the holder of the nonre-
course note could not realize more than the fair market value of
the asset securing the note, $100. In short, in the context of this
hypothetical, the value of the note can never exceed the value of
the asset securing it, and the resulting equality of consideration
makes the sham doctrine inapplicable. This is not to suggest, how-
ever, that basis should equal $200. On the contrary, in accordance
with the likelihood-of-payment rationale, basis should be zero.
Thus, there is no need to apply the sham doctrine in this
context. 48
In some circumstances, however, the sham doctrine will have
application with respect to a transaction in which the nonrecourse
note has a face amount in excess of the value of the acquired asset.
For example, assume a taxpayer purchases an asset with a value of
$100 by delivering $50 in cash and a $200 nonrecourse note to the
146. The taxpayer also provided the seller with $25,000 in cash. Id. at 32. Thus, if there
was any inequality, it was only present to the extent of $25,000-the difference between 1)
the sum of the value of the first mortgage notes (which was also the value of the motel) and
the $25,000 in cash and 2) the value of the motel. For a discussion of the appropriate treat-
ment of the $25,000 cash payment, see text accompanying notes 158-60 infra.
147. See text & accompanying notes 14-36 supra.
148. But see Gallagher, Fiscal Alchemy and the Crane Rule: Alternative Solutions to
the Tax Shelter, 8 CONN. L. REV. 607, 629 (1976), where it is suggested that the "purpose-
less activity" doctrine of Goldstein and presumably the sham doctrine are applicable in this
context, but difficult to apply. Moreover, it is perhaps arguable that where a nonrecourse
note is intentionally structured to substantially exceed the fair market value of the encum-
bered asset for the sole purpose of accomplishing tax reduction, the sham doctrine should
apply despite the equality of consideration. As indicated in text, however, the question has
no practical significance, inasmuch as such a nonrecourse note will always be excluded from
basis by virtue of the likelihood-of-payment rationale.
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seller. Here, there is an inequality of consideration: the value of
the asset is $100: the value of the consideration package delivered
by the taxpayer, however, is $150 - the sum of the value of the
note, which is equal to the value of the acquired asset, and the
cash consideration of $50. If this inequality is not attributable to
mistake or the taxpayer's desire to obtain some additional asset or
benefit from the seller, the sham doctrine should be applied.
The likelihood-of-payment rationale dictates the exclusion of
the $200 nonrecourse note from basis. The sham doctrine, however,
must be utilized to determine the appropriate characterization of
the $50 cash payment. While it has thus far been suggested that
the only purpose of the sham doctrine, with respect to basis com-
putation, is to prevent a taxpayer from claiming a basis in excess
of the fair market value of the asset acquired, the doctrine must
assume a different function in the context of this hypothetical.
This hypothetical presents a transaction that, in its entirety, is a
sham. In the hypotheticals previously analyzed under the sham
doctrine, the author has opined that only a portion of the transac-
tion should be disregarded as a sham, that is, the portion of the
purchase price that is in excess of the fair market value of the ac-
quired asset. Once it is concluded that the entire transaction con-
stitutes a sham, it seems appropriate to disregard, for tax pur-
poses, every aspect of the transaction, including the $50 cash
payment. Indeed, it would appear that the cash payment, properly
characterized, is nothing more than a fee paid by the taxpayer for
the services necessary to arrange the sham.
The same policy objectives that enable the tax authorities to
disregard the sham transaction itself also compel similar treatment
for such fees. 149 Thus, the $50 cash payment, as well as the $200
nonrecourse note, should be disregarded for tax purposes, and the
taxpayer's basis should be zero. 150 While this result may seem
149. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
150. In Knetsch v. United States, 348 F.2d 932 (Ct. Cl. 1965), a taxpayer claimed a
deduction for out-of-pocket losses incurred in connection with a transaction which the Su-
preme Court had previously held was a sham. See text accompanying notes 37-50 supra.
The Court of Claims held that the taxpayer was not entitled to such a deduction, since the
transaction was motivated solely by tax-avoidance objectives. The Internal Revenue Service,
in Rev. Rul. 77-185, 1977-1 C.B. 48, citing the Court of Claims decision in Knetsch, disal-
lowed the transactional costs incurred in a commodity straddle on the rationale that the
transaction was completely lacking in economic motivation. I.R.C. § 183 should also have
application in this context. See note 38 supra.
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harsh, it must be emphasized that it will only obtain where the
entire transaction is a sham. The crucial question, then, is whether
a transaction that is potentially a candidate for the sham doctrine
constitutes a partial or total sham. A transaction must be deemed
a sham in its entirety where, as in the hypothetical under inquiry,
a nonrecourse note is to be excluded from the basis computation,
by virtue of the likelihood-of-payment rationale. 151 In these cir-
cumstances, it would be foolish for the taxpayer to discharge the
note, for the only benefit he would thereby secure would be the
retention of an asset with a fair market value that is less than the
amount payable on the note. In effect, therefore, when a taxpayer
makes a cash payment in addition to delivering a nonrecourse note
that violates the likelihood-of-payment rationale, in a transaction
that purports to be an asset acquisition, he has merely paid a fee
for the opportunity to secure tax reduction.'52 Indeed, the transac-
tion yields nothing but tax reduction to the taxpayer, for it is ex-
In May v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 279 (1972), the court, faced with a sham
transaction, concluded: "[A]lthough the transaction was dressed up to look like a sale on the
basis of which petitioner might claim $365,000 depreciation deductions, all that really oc-
curred here was petitioner's payment of $35,000 for a facade to enable him to claim such
deductions." Id. at 284. See also Dresser v. United States, 55 F.2d 499 (Ct. Cl. 1932), where
the court denied a taxpayer a loss deduction incurred in the acquisition of a worthless asset.
Since the worthless asset acquired in Dresser is analogous to the asset acquired by the issu-
ance of a nonrecourse note which is substantially in excess'of the asset's fair market value,
the court's analysis is particularly relevant:
If a taxpayer chooses to pay or contribute money in any transaction, which
under all the circumstances known to him at the time, is a hopeless venture, and
from which he has no reasonable expectation of profit, he is not entitled to take
the amounts paid or contributed as a deduction from income for tax purposes.
Id. at 510. Accord. Lewis v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1964); Goodstein v. Com-
missioner, 30 T.C. 1178 (1959), aff'd, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959). These decisions should be
contrasted with the First Circuit's decision in Goodstein; Lynch v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d
867 (2d Cir. 1957); Fabreka Products Co. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 290 (1960); Sherman v.
Commissioner, 34 T.C. 303 (1960); Marcus v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1263 (1971).
151. Although this issue was not before it, the court, in Hager, 76 T.C. 759 (1981),
suggested that "[i]t is possible that whenever a large amount of nonrecourse indebtedness is
created in a sale of property and, as a result of the amount of such indebtedness, the buyer
fails to acquire an equity in the property, the sale might be entirely disregarded for Federal
income tax purposes." Id. at 775, n.8. Indeed, in determining that the taxpayer did not have
a sufficient profit motive to avoid I.R.C. § 183, the court relied considerably on its finding
that the nonrecourse debt unreasonably exceeded the value of the acquired asset. Id. at 784.
152. It was proposed, in 1956, that where the nonrecourse debt is in excess of the value
of the encumbered asset, basis should equal the amount of the cash payment. The proposal
was never enacted. See Adams, supra note 9, at 165.
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pected, at the outset, that the asset will be forfeited.15 3 Since no
portion of the transaction is motivated by economic objectives, no
portion of the transaction, by virtue of the sham doctrine, should
be respected for tax purposes:"" that is, in the absence of some
business objective, basis should be zero, notwithstanding the pres-
ence of a cash payment. 5
Contrast this with an asset acquisition in which the taxpayer
delivers to the seller a nonrecourse note that is equal to or less
than the fair market value of the asset acquired.1 5 6 As distin-
guished from the total sham transaction, application of the likeli-
hood-of-payment rationale indicates that it is reasonable to assume
153. The position opted for here, that, despite the presence of a cash payment, basis
should be zero where a nonrecourse debt exceeds the fair market value of the asset acquired,
should be limited to those acquisitions that require the buyer to apply all income produced
by the asset to discharge the debt. Where the buyer is not so obligated, he has acquired, in
addition to tax reduction, an economic benefit, the use of the asset and the income it pro-
duces until the maturity of the note, at which time forefiture will occur. In such situations,
the taxpayer, being motivated by economic objectives to the extent of the fair market value
of the asset's income stream during the term of the note, should be entitled to a basis equal
to the fair market value of such income stream - in no event, however, should basis exceed
the cash payment. The balance of the cash payment is, in essence, a fee for securing tax
reduction and should be disregarded as a sham.
It is possible, however, that a taxpayer who acquires an asset for cash and a nonrecourse
note that runs afoul of the likelihood-of-payment analysis would be entitled to a basis
greater than zero even where the transaction does not provide the taxpayer with an income
stream. This would occur where a portion of the cash payment is attributable to the price of
securing an option to buy the encumbered asset. For example, assume a taxpayer purchases
an asset with a value of $300 by delivering a nonrecourse note in the amount of $400, paya-
ble one year from the date of purchase (with all income generated by the asset prior to the
maturity date of the note payable to the obligee), and $100 in cash. After applying the sham
doctrine and the likelihood-of-payment analysis, it would appear that the taxpayer's basis
for the asset should be zero. However, if the value of an option to purchase the asset for
$400, which is the face amount of the nonrecourse note during the one-year period com-
mencing on the day the transaction is entered into, has a value of $50, the taxpayer's basis
should be $50. Since the taxpayer has acquired an asset, the option with a value of $50 from
the seller, to that extent the taxpayer is economically motivated and should not be subject
to the sham doctrine.
154. As a consequence, the penalty provided for in I.R.C. § 6659 should apply to the
entire underpayment resulting from the reduction of basis to zero. For a further discussion
of the penalty, see note 107 supra.
155. If the taxpayer agrees to pay the inflated price by reason of a mistake, the cash
payment would be motivated by economic objectives and should be reflected in basis. The
nonrecourse note should, nevertheless, be excluded from basis, inasmuch as mistake is irrel-
evant in the context of the likelihood-of-payment rationale. See text accompanying notes
103-07 supra.
156. The nonrecourse note contemplated is one that does not run afoul of the likeli-
hood-of-payment rationale.
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that the taxpayer will pay the entire purchase price, including his
obligation on the nonrecourse note, and thereby accomplish the
business objective of retaining the asset. In this situation, if the
taxpayer overpays, the sham doctrine will only preclude the inclu-
sion of the overpayment in the basis computation - the taxpayer's
basis will equal the fair market value of the asset acquired. Only a
portion of the transaction, the overpayment, is deemed a sham, be-
cause, to the extent of the asset's fair market value, the transaction
is economically motivated. In essence, the transaction is capable of
division into two portions: 1) to the extent of the asset's fair mar-
ket value, the taxpayer is economically motivated by his desire to
acquire the asset and should be entitled to a basis equal to fair
market value, and 2) the overpayment, motivated solely by tax-
avoidance objectives, is disregarded for tax purposes as a sham.
For example, assume a taxpayer purchases an asset with a
value of $100 by delivering to the seller a $100 nonrecourse note
(with a fair market value of $100) and $50 in cash. Each of the two
components of the consideration package delivered by the taxpayer
is supported by a separate purpose: 1) $100 of the consideration
furnished by the taxpayer is motivated by a business objective, the
taxpayer's desire to acquire the asset, and 2) $50 of the considera-
tion furnished by the taxpayer, which represents an overpayment,
is motivated solely by the taxpayer's desire to obtain tax reduc-
tion.157 Thus, this transaction constitutes a partial sham - the
overpayment is disregarded as a sham, and the balance of the con-
sideration furnished by the taxpayer, paid in furtherance of a busi-
ness objective, is reflected in basis, which is, therefore, equal to
$100.
This notion, that, regardless of any cash payment, the sham
doctrine will always produce a basis of zero where a nonrecourse
debt issued in the transaction runs afoul of the likelihood-of-pay-
ment rationale, should have been applied in Morris. As indicated,
the taxpayer in Morris purchased a motel subject to a debt that
was substantially in excess of the motel's fair market value. In ad-
dition, the taxpayer delivered to the seller $25,000 in cash. Finding
that tax avoidance was the sole motivation for the overpayment,
the court properly invoked the sham doctrine. The court, however,
157. It is assumed that the overpayment is not the result of a mistake or a desire to
obtain some other asset or benefit.
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held that basis was equal to the fair market value of the motel.
This holding would appear to be erroneous: the transaction was a
sham in its entirety because the nonrecourse debt was substan-
tially in excess of the motel's fair market value; the basis should
have been zero.158 This is not to suggest, however, that the court's
analysis is necessarily inconsistent with the conclusions opted for
here, for the Government, not the taxpayer, argued that basis
should equal the motel's fair market value.15 9 Perhaps, in the ab-
sence of such an argument, the court would have held the taxpayer
entitled to a basis of zero.6 0
In each of the authorities analyzed thus far that applied the
sham doctrine in the basis computation context, the overpayment
was made to a party who was related to the taxpayer. The presence
of such a relationship in each case presumably facilitated the hold-
ing that the transaction was a sham. Indeed, in each case, the
claim to an inflated basis was supported by the mere withdrawal
by the taxpayer of money from one of its pockets and the simulta-
neous deposit of the same amount in another of its pockets. The
question now posed is whether the doctrine is dependent on the
presence of such a relationship.
158. The entire amount of the nonrecourse debt should have been excluded from basis
by reason of the likelihood-of-payment rationale. The cash payment of $25,000 should also
have been excluded under a sham analysis. But see note 153 supra.
159. 59 T.C. at 32. See also the Government's position in Marcus v. Commissioner, 30
T.C.M. (CCH) 1263 (1971); Gibson Products Co. v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D.
Tex. 1978), aff'd, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981). The diffidence of the Government is under-
standable since, at that time, commentators as well were of the view that basis should equal
fair market value, even where it is somewhat less than the amount of the debt. See Adams,
supra note 9, at 165; Del Cotto, supra note 9, at 73. Indeed, Congress manifested a similar
view, enacted in I.R.C. § 752(c). See McGuire, supra note 9, at 439.
160. The conclusion that basis should have been held to equal zero presents an inter-
esting question: if the value of the motel eventually increases beyond the amount of the
encumbering liabilities, should the taxpayer be permitted to include the $25,000 cash pay-
meit in basis for purposes of computing gain? While this question is a nettlesome one, it is
suggested that the taxpayer should not be permitted to reflect the cash payment in basis.
Indeed, the cash payment, it has been argued, was not made for the purpose of acquiring
the asset. Rather, the sole purpose for the cash outlay was to structure an artifice that would
yield tax savings. As such, the cash expenditure should be viewed as a fee for arranging the
transaction as opposed to a cost of acquisition. While this result may seem harsh, the alter-
native solution, to allow the cash investment to be reflected in basis for purposes of gain
computation, while excluding it from basis for purposes of the depreciation deduction and
the investment tax credit, would be inconsistent with I.R.C. § 167(g), and § 168(a). Compare
I.R.C. § 183(b)(2).
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In Thompson v. Commissioner,"1 a trust company, located in
the Bahamas, purchased all of the outstanding shares of a shell
corporation for $750. Shortly thereafter, the trust company made a
contribution to the capital of the corporation in the amount of
$650,000. The corporation then purchased a parcel of real estate
for $700,000 by delivering to the seller a note, secured by the real
estate, in the same amount.1 62 Within three months after the cor-
poration purchased the real estate, the trust company sold 98% 163
of its stock in the corporation to a group of investors for
$6,800,000. The investors paid the trust company by delivering to
it unsecured promissory notes, bearing interest at the rate of 10%,
in the amount of $6,800,000. Within a few months after the inves-
tors purchased the stock, they made an interest payment to the
trust company in the amount of $475,000. The Internal Revenue
Service disallowed the interest deduction claimed by some of the
investors on the theory that the note given to the trust company
constituted a sham.1 6
In sustaining the disallowance, the court indicated its approval
of the Tax Court finding that "a purchase and resale [of the corpo-
rate stock] within 3 months at a tenfold increase in price strains
reasonable credulity."1 5 Having determined that the investors
substantially overpaid for the stock, the court held that the notes
and the interest payments should, by virtue of the sham doctrine,
be disregarded for tax purposes.1 6 The predicate for invoking the
doctrine was the court's tacit conclusion that the overpayment was
motivated solely by tax-reduction objectives.1 67
161. 631 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1980).
162. In addition, the corporation gave the seller $650,000 in cash: $280,000 of this
amount represented prepaid interest on the note at the rate of 10% for a period of four
years; the balance of $370,000 represented an advance fee for the arrangement of mortgage
financing, with respect to the construction of a shopping center and apartments upon the
parcel, which the seller agreed to help secure. Id. at 644.
163. The actual percentage of stock sold -was 98.583%. Id.
164. The sham doctrine analysis should be the same, regardless of whether it is an in-
terest deduction or a basis computation that is in issue.
165. Thompson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 1024, 1051 (1976).
166. Id. at 1050.
167. While the court did not explicity state that the overpayment was motivated solely
by a desire to accomplish tax avoidance, the court, before invoking the sham doctrine, indi-
cated that a sham transaction is one that has no "economic effect other than the creation of
income tax losses." 631 F.2d at 646. Also, the court suggested that the interposition of the
trust company between the owner of the real estate and the investors, which was the mecha-
nism utilized in order to create the inflated purchase price and the investors' notes, was
1981]
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What is particularly interesting is that the notes, which were
held by the court to constitute shams, were recourse in nature,
and, while the court was suspicious of a relationship between the
taxpayers and the others involved in the transaction, no evidence
of such a relationship was before the court. In these circumstances,
it appeared that the economic cost incurred by the taxpayer in ac-
quiring the corporate stock was the entire purchase price of
$6,800,000. Indeed, unless there was some arrangement between
the taxpayers and the others that would require reimbursement,
the interest deduction in dispute represented an out-of-pocket ex-
pense incurred by the taxpayers in the amount of $475,000. Recog-
nizing that the notes were recourse and that the taxpayers had ap-
parently sustained an out-of-pocket expense, the court had
difficulty in reaching its conclusion that tax-reduction objectives
were the sole motivation for the overpayment. The court resolved
this difficulty by utilizing its finding of a substantial overpayment
to infer the presence of a relationship between the taxpayers and
the others participating in the transaction. In the absence of such a
relationship, the court apparently reasoned, a prudent taxpayer
would not agree to an overpayment. Having made this inference,
the court was obviously more comfortable with its decision to in-
voke the sham doctrine.
The presence of a substantial overpayment should not, how-
ever, inexorably lead to the inference that the taxpayer is related
in some manner to those with whom he is transacting business.
Nor should such an inference be an essential predicate for invoking
the sham doctrine. As indicated, it is feasible for a taxpayer to re-
alize a profit by overpaying in connection with the acquisition of
an asset - the tax reduction that would be generated by the over-
payment and the interest income produced by the tax savings can
exceed the amount of the overpayment - even if the overpayment
is made to a stranger and will, therefore, not be recouped by the
taxpayer.""8 Such overpayments, supported by no motivation other
than the desire to secure tax reduction and related interest income,
should, under the sham doctrine, be disregarded, despite the ab-
sence of a relationship between the taxpayer and the seller."'9
done "in order artificially to create tax deductions." Id. at 647.
168. See text & accompanying notes 51-60 supra.
169. Where no such relationship exists, the overpayment will produce an out-of-pocket
cost for the taxpayer. The taxpayer, of course, will be willing to sustain this cost if the
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Why then did the Thompson court think it necessary to infer
the existence of a relationship in order to invoke the sham doc-
trine? Apparently, the court's impression was that the tax reduc-
tion and related interest income engendered by the overpayment
would not be as great as the amount of the overpayment.17 0 Thus,
if the taxpayer had not had a relationship or understanding with
resulting tax reduction and related interest income exceed the amount of overpayment.
Where a taxpayer intentionally structures such an overpayment solely in order to secure tax
reduction and related interest income, the sham doctrine and its underlying policy consider-
ations dictate disregard of the overpayment. See text accompanying notes 127-28 supra.
In Rev. Rul. 80-329, 1980-2 C.B. 70, the taxpayer intentionally overpaid for an item and
then, upon donating it to charity, claimed a charitable donation (see I.R.C. § 170) equal to
the inflated price. Although the taxpayer purchased the item from one with whom he did
not maintain any relationship or understanding, and, therefore, sustained an out-of-pocket
cost equal to the inflated purchase price, the Service properly limited the deduction to the
item's fair market value, which, it concluded, was substantially below the taxpayer's out-of-
pocket cost. It should be noted that the taxpayer paid the portion of the purchase price that
represented the overpayment by the delivery of a recourse note. While the Service does not
so indicate, it was, presumably, the taxpayer's assumption that the tax reduction and re-
lated interest income which would arise from the overpayment would exceed the amount of
the overpayment. See also Rev. Rul. 81-149, 1981-21 I.R.B. 5, where the Service ruled that
interest on a 50-year recourse note, the delivery of which was motivated solely by tax-avoid-
ance purposes, was not deductible, even though the taxpayer was legally obligated to make
the interest payments and there was apparently no relationship between the taxpayer and
the holder of the note.
Compare the conclusion of the Service in Rev. Rul. 80-329 with Goldstein v. Commis-
sioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), where the Second Circuit indicated that in its view a
debt to an unrelated party that the taxpayer will be required to discharge, though incurred
solely for tax-avoidance purposes, does not constitute a sham. See note 50 supra.
170. Even if it is assumed that the taxpayers had a marginal income tax bracket of 70%
and that the entire overpayment had been deductible in the year in which the transaction
was consummated (which, of course, was not the case), the tax reduction and related inter-
est income attributable to the overpayment would probably have been less than the amount
of the overpayment. For each dollar of overpayment, assuming an immediate deduction and
a 70% bracket, the taxpayers would have generated 70 cents in tax reduction. They would
have this 70 cents available to produce interest income for 10 years, the term of the note. At
the note's maturity, the taxpayers would be required to pay the trust company the dollar. In
addition, of course, the taxpayers were required to pay 10% interest each year during the
term of the note, with respect to each dollar of overpayment.
This transaction should be viewed as a loan of 70 cents (for each dollar of overpayment)
to the taxpayers at an interest rate of 12.395% (which takes into account the stated interest
rate of 10% and what is, in essence, a discount of 30 cents, the difference between the
amount the taxpayers received (70 cents) and the amount they were required to repay ($1)).
If the taxpayers had not been able to invest the 70 cents at a rate of at least 12.395%, they
would have sustained an economic loss as a result of the overpayment. Since interest rates
in 1965 were, generally, less than 12.395% (see, e.g., Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1965, at 3, cold), the
court's implicit conclusion that the taxpayers would have sustained an economic loss by
virtue of the overpayment seems appropriate.
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the other participants whereby the taxpayers would be entitled to
reimbursement of some portion of the overpayment, the taxpayers
would have undoubtedly suffered an economic loss as a result of
the overpayment. Since neither a mistake nor the acquisition of an
additional asset or benefit was present, and since it was not reason-
able to assume that prudent taxpayers would knowingly enter into
a transaction that would inevitably produce an economic loss, the
court, in invoking the sham doctrine, properly inferred the exis-
tence of such a relationship or understanding.17 1
In sum, overpayments that are motivated by tax-reduction
objectives and, consequently, disregarded under the sham doctrine,
occur either 1) in the context of a relationship or understanding
between the taxpayer and the other participants in the transaction
or 2) where no such relationship or understanding exists, if the
taxpayer is able to anticipate that the tax reduction and related
interest income inherent in the overpayment will be greater than
the overpayment. Any overpayment that falls without the scope of
these two categories must be attributable to either mistake or the
taxpayer's desire to acquire some additional asset or benefit.
One additional aspect of the Thompson court's conclusion
warrants comment. The court held that the taxpayers were not en-
titled to deduct any portion of their interest payment.7 2 Presuma-
bly, the court was of the view that the transaction constituted a
total sham. Indeed, the Tax Court relied upon, although the Court
of Appeals did not cite, Estate of Melcher v. Commissioner,173
where the court held that the transaction before it constituted a
total sham.17 4 One might argue, however, that the transaction
structured by. the taxpayers in Thompson was only a partial sham.
That is, the recourse notes delivered by the taxpayers to the trust
company as payment for the purchase of the stock should have
171. A similar situation confronted the Tax Court in May v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M,
(CCH) 279 (1972). There, a taxpayer purchased television film rights for $365,000, paying
$35,000 in cash and delivering a recourse note in the amount of $330,000. The court, con-
cluding that the transaction offered no economic benefit and was, therefore, a sham, sus-
tained the commissioner's disallowance of depreciation deductions in the amount of
$365,000. As in Thompson, though there was no finding of an explicit relationship between
the taxpayer and the holder of the note, the court inferred a relationship, concluding that
"the owners of the films never intended to require [the taxpayer] to pay any such purchase
price." Id. at 284.
172. 631 F.2d at 648.
173. 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1010 (1970).
174. See id. at 1042-45.
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been dichotomized: 1) to the extent of the fair market value of the
stock, delivery by the taxpayers of their recourse notes was moti-
vated by economic objectives, the desire to acquire the stock, and
should not have been declared a sham; and 2) the portion of the
recourse notes that was in excess of the stock's fair market value
was the result of the taxpayers' desire to secure tax reduction and
should have been disregarded under the sham doctrine. Thus,
under this analysis, the portion of the interest payment attributa-
ble to the part of the notes supported by economic objectives was
properly deducted, while the remainder of the interest payment
was properly disallowed. 17 5
G. The Internal Revenue Service Speaks
In its initial attempt to apply the sham doctrine in a basis
computation coritext, the Internal Revenue Service confused the
doctrine with the likelihood-of-payment rationale. In Rev. Rul. 79-
432,176 the taxpayer purchased an "art tax shelter"1 ' 7  for a
purchase price of $200,000. The taxpayer paid the purchase price
by delivering to the seller $30,000 in cash -and a nonrecourse
175. In Melcher, a taxpayer was interested in purchasing a residence. Instead of
purchasing the property directly, however, he caused a corporation that he and his attorneys
controlled to purchase the property for $85,000. Shortly thereafter, the corporation resold
the property to the taxpayer for $110,000. The taxpayer paid the purchase price to the
corporation by delivering a note in the amount of $80,000 and by assuming a mortgage
secured by the property in the amount of $30,000. The taxpayer then made a substantial
interest payment with respect to the $80,000 note to the corporation. Disallowing the entire
interest deduction, the court held that the transaction constituted a total sham. Crucial to
the court's holding was its conclusion that the corporation had merely acted as an agent on
behalf of the taxpayer in purchasing the property - indeed, it was the taxpayer, the court
found, who furnished the corporation with all of the funds it required in order to consum-
mate its purchase of the property. Accordingly, but for the taxpayer's tax-reduction objec-
tives, there was no need to interpose the corporation.
Unlike Melcher, however, the Thompson court did not make a finding that it was the
taxpayers who furnished the trust company with the funds it contributed to the corpora-
tion's capital. Had such a finding been made, the total sham analysis, as made by the
Melcher court, would have been appropriate. Perhaps, however, the court's holding is ex-
plainable on the ground that the taxpayers failed to sustain their burden of proof with re-
spect to the government's total sham theory-failed to establish that it was they who fur-
nished the trust company with funds used to make the capital contribution.
176. 1979-2 C.B. 289.
177. The bundle of rights purchased by the taxpayer consisted of: 1) an original master
lithographic plate, 2) the right to a specified number of limited edition prints, and 3) com-
mon law and statutory copyrights.
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note,I17 secured by the "art tax shelter," in the amount of $170,000,
bearing interest at the rate of 8%, payable approximately 12 years
from the time of purchase. Although all of the interest and princi-
pal were not payable until the maturity date of the note, the tax-
payer was required to prepay principal and interest to the extent
of 50% of the net proceeds realized by the taxpayer from the in-
vestment. In making its analysis, the Service determined that the
fair market value of the investment package purchased by the tax-
payer was $30,000.179
The Service held that the taxpayer was entitled to a basis of
$30,000.180 In support of this conclusion, reference was implicitly
made to the likelihood-of-payment rationale:
Rev. Rul. 77-110 ... and Rev. Rul. 78-29 ... hold that the liability created
by a nonrecourse note given as a part of the purchase price of property can-
not be included in the basis of the property where the value of the property
cannot be shown at least to approximate the value of the consideration, in-,
cluding the amount of the note. In the present case, because the property
securing the note has a fair market value of only $30,000, there is no eco-
nomic incentive for the taxpayer actually to pay the note to avoid the loss of
the property. Thus, under the rationale of Rev. Ruls. 77-110 and 78-29, the
amount of the note is not includible in taxpayer's basis. 181
If the first of the quoted sentences is disregarded, the analysis, in-
sofar as the likelihood-of-payment rationale is concerned, is valid.
The difficulty with the first sentence is its focus on a comparison of
the value of the asset acquired with the value of the consideration
package delivered by the taxpayer to the seller in exchange for the
asset. The suggestion that the cited rulings require such a compari-
son is also vexing. Indeed, both rulings properly require a compari-son of the value of the asset acquired with the unpaid balance of
the nonrecourse note.182
178. Although the note purported to be recourse to the extent of $70,000, the Service
concluded that, as a matter of substance, the entire note was nonrecourse. See note 80
supra.
179. The Service made this finding despite the presence of two appraisals Which indi-
cated that the estimated revenue to be derived from the investment package was approxi-
mately $200,000. See 1979-2 C.B. 289.
180. Since the Service concluded that the asset acquired did not have a determinable
useful life, it held that.neither a depreciation deduction nor the investment tax credit was
available with respect to this basis of $30,000.
181. Rev. Rul. 79-432, 1979-2 C.B. at 291 (citations omitted).
182. Rev. Ruls. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58 and 78-29, 1978-1 C.B. 62, explicitly rely on the
source of the likelihood-of-payment rationale, the Crane case. Moreover, both rulings quote
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Why, then, did the Internal Revenue Service, in the first of
the sentences quoted from Rev. Rul. 79-432, suggest that it is nec-
essary to compare the value of the asset acquired with the value of
all of the consideration, including the cash payment, delivered by
the taxpayer to the seller? Since such a comparison is required in
order to determine whether the taxpayer has structured an over-
payment that should be disregarded under the sham doctrine, one
must assume that the Service, in limiting basis to the amount of
the cash payment, intended to invoke the doctrine. The Service's
perception that it was necessary to invoke the doctrine is trouble-
some, however, for the likelihood-of-payment rationale itself man-
dated disregard of the nonrecourse note and, therefore, a basis
equal to the amount of the cash payment.
Confusing the likelihood-of-payment rationale with a sham
analysis led the Service to the wrong conclusion. Properly viewed,
the transaction was a total sham. The value of the package of con-
sideration delivered by the taxpayer, consisting of $30,000 in cash
and a nonrecourse note in the amount of $170,000, certainly ex-
ceeded $30,000, the value of the asset acquired. If this lack of
equality in the value of consideration packages exchanged was not
attributable to a mistake,1 3 or the taxpayer's desire to acquire an
additional asset or benefit from the seller, the sham doctrine was
applicable. While invocation of the sham doctrine generally results
in a basis that is equal to the fair market value of the acquired
asset, where the value of the asset is less than the amount of the
nonrecourse note it secures, basis should equal zero. This zero ba-
sis conclusion is premised on the notion that a taxpayer will not
discharge a nonrecourse note that is in excess of the value of the
acquired asset. Consequently, 'such a taxpayer, confronting an in-
evitable forfeiture of the asset, obtains no economic benefit from
the transaction - the transaction is merely a device for providing
from the portion of the Supreme Court's decision in which it is indicated that a nonrecourse
debt should be treated as if recourse in nature and, therefore, includable in basis, where the
balance on the note is less than the value of the asset securing it. For a discussion of the
relevance of cash payments in the context of the rationale, see text accompanying notes 4-7
supra.
183. The appraisals, which were provided by the sales promotion organization, should
have provided the taxpayer with an opportunity to argue that the overpayment was the
result of a mistake. See Curry v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 667, 694-95 (1965), where the court
concluded that the taxpayer's reliance, in good faith, on an appraisal precluded a finding
that the price was inflated in order to secure tax reduction.
1981]
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the taxpayer with tax reduction. As such, the transaction, includ-
ing the cash payment, should be disregarded for tax purposes and
basis should equal zero."-'
It is arguable, however, that the transaction did provide the
taxpayer with some economic benefit. Until the maturity date of
the notes, the taxpayer was permitted to retain 50% of the income
generated by the asset.18 5 Thus, the taxpayer did secure an eco-
nomic benefit: the right to receive 50% of the income generated
by the asset during the term of the note. To the extent of the value
of this benefit, the taxpayer was obviously motivated by economic
objectives. Since the sham doctrine only operates with respect to
transactions or portions of transactions that are motivated by tax-
reduction objectives exclusively and since economic objectives, to
the extent of the value of the income stream, were present, it was
appropriate to provide the taxpayer with a basis equal to the fair
market value of the income stream. 186 The taxpayer's basis, there-
fore, should have been no more than $15,000 - the fair market of
the asset being $30,000, the value of the right to receive 50% of the
income generated by the asset for a specific period of time could
not have exceeded $15,000.1s7
The failure of the Service to distinguish between the likeli-
hood-of-payment rationale and the sham doctrine, which resulted
in an erroneous basis computation,' may have been caused by the
184. The cash payment should be viewed as a fee for arranging the sham transaction
and should, therefore, be denied tax effect. See text accompanying notes 150-60 supra.
185. The other 50% of the income generated by the asset was required to be applied to
discharge the interest and principal obligation on the note.
186. Basis, llowever, cannot exceed the amount of the cash payment, since the likeli-
h~od-of-payment rationale precludes inclusion of any portion of the nonrecourse note in the
basis computation.
187. The difference between the amount of the cash payment, $30,000, and the fair
market value of the income stream, should be viewed as a cost incurred in order to secure
the tax benefits inherent in the sham transaction. Accordingly, this difference should be
disregarded for tax purposes. See text accompanying notes 149-60 supra.
188. While the Service did not refer to the sham doctrine or suggest that it was neces-
sary to focus on the value of the consideration furnished by the taxpayer in Rev. Rul. 77-110
or Rev. Rul. 78-29-both rulings only applied the likelihood-of-payment rationale and, thus,
required a comparison of the fair market value of the asset with the amount of the nonre-
course note secured by the asset-the doctrine should have been applied. In both rulings,
the-Service concluded that basis was equal to the amount of the cash payment. If the Ser-
vice had applied the doctrine, however, it would have arrived at a basis, in accordance with
the analysis suggested in the text, that would have been less than the amount of the cash
payment.
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misconception of the court in Estate of Franklin v. Commis-
sioner.1 9 The court, as did the Service in Rev. Rul. 79-432,
blended the two concepts:
An acquisition such as that of Associates [the partnership of which the tax-
payer was a member] if at a price approximately equal to the fair market
value of the property under ordinary circumstances would rather quickly
yield an equity in the property which the purchaser could not prudently
abandon. This is the stuff of substance. It meshes with the form of the trans-
action and constitutes a sale.
No such meshing occurs when the purchase price exceeds a demonstrably
reasonable estimate of the fair market value. Payments on tlre principal of
the purchase price yield no equity so long as the unpaid balance of the
purchase price exceeds the then existing fair market value. 190
In the last of the quoted sentences, the court properly applies the
likelihood-of-payment rationale by comparing the value of the as-
set with the unpaid balance on the nonrecourse note it secures. In
'the preceeding sentences, however, the court mistakenly makes its
likelihood-of-payment analysis by comparing the value of the asset
with the purchase price, which in all cases obviously consists of the
debt as well as any cash payments.
While, as suggested, focus on the amount of the cash payment
is irrelevant in the context of the likelihood-of-payment rationale,
the court's holding was not affected by this erroneous analysis, for
the taxpayer had not made a cash payment.19' Since, therefore, the
purchase price was equal to the amount of the nonrecourse note,
the court's failure to distinguish between these two amounts was
inconsequential.'92 However, where a cash payment is present, as
in Rev. Rul. 79-432, the likelihood-of-payment rationale should be
applied, without taking into account the cash payment, in order to
determine whether the nonrecourse note should be included in ba-
189. 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
190. Id. at 1048.
191. The taxpayer did make a $75,000 cash payment. However, this payment was char-
acterized as interest.
192. In Narver v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 53 (1980), the court also blended the likeli-
hood-of-payment rationale and the sham doctrine. Indeed, the court, after citing Franklin
and implicitly alluding to the likelihood-of-payment rationale, discussed cases concerning
equality of consideration and mistake, neither of which has any relevance in the context of
the likelihood-of-payment rationale-the court should have reached its conclusion that the
nonrecourse liability was not includable in basis solely by reference to the likelihood-of-
payment rationale. Again, however; the absence of a cash payment rendered the blending of
the two concepts inconsequential.
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sis. The sham doctrine should then be brought into focus in order
to determine whether the cash payment or any portion of it should
be included in basis.
The Internal Revenue Service again ruled on a basis issue with
sham implications in Rev. Rul. 80-42.193 There, a limited partner-
ship purchased film exhibition rights from a corporation for 2,000x
dollars by delivering to the corporation a nonrecourse note in the
face amount of 1,500x dollars Secured by the exhibition rights and
500x dollars in cash. The partnership was required to prepay its
interest and principal obligations on the note to the extent of 50%
of the net receipts derived by the partnership from the distribution
of the film. M1 4 The Service assumed that because the corporation
had purchased the film rights for 400x dollars a few months prior
to entering into the transaction with the partnership, the partner-
ship could not prove a fair market value in excess of 400x dollars
for the rights acquired. The Service also assumed that the partner-
ship agreed to pay more than fair market value for the rights in
order to enjoy the tax advantages inherent in an inflated basis.1 95
In concluding that the partnership's basis for the film rights
was 400x dollars, the Service relied on the likelihood-of-payment
rationale and, implicitly, the notion that a taxpayer who overpays
for an item in order to acquire some additional asset or benefit
from the seller may not reflect the overpayment in the item's ba-
sis.19 While the Service properly analyzed the former concept, its
decision to apply the latter concept resulted in an erroneous basis
computation. With respect to the likelihood-of-payment rationale,
the Service compared the face amount of the nonrecourse note
193. 1980-1 C.B. 182.
194. Id. at 183.
195. Id.
196. While the Service did not explicitly articulate reliance on this notion, its citation
of Majestic Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1941), and New Hamp-
shire Fire Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 708 (1943) does confirm the reading sug-
gested. See text & accompanying notes 113-25 supra. Inasmuch as' 1) the overpayment was
not attributable to mistake, 2) there was no relationship (no identity of economic interests)
between the limited partners and the general partner, who, as the majority shareholder of
the seller, was the ultimate beneficiary of the overpayment, and 3) the tax-reduction poten-
tial inherent in a cash overpayment is always less than the amount of the overpayment, the
only plausible motivation for the partnership to pay 500x dollars in cash for an asset with a
value of 400x dollars was the desire to acquire some additional benefit. One might surmise
that, in the Service's view, the additional benefit acquired by the partnership was the orga-
nizational services rendered by the general partner.
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(1500x dollars) with the fair market value of the film rights ac-
quired (400x dollars) and correctly concluded that it was highly
improbable that the partnership would discharge such an obliga-
tion in order to retain the film rights. Thus, the Service's initial
conclusion that the basis computation should not include the non-
recourse debt was sound.
Having decided that the note ran afoul of the likelihood-of-
payment rationale, the Service should have recognized that the
transaction constituted a total sham197 and that the cash payment
of 500x dollars was a cost of arranging the transaction. This view of
the transaction requires the conclusion that the partnership's basis
in the film rights should have been zero. 198 On the other hand, it is
arguable that the partnership did secure some economic benefit
from the acquisition: the right to receive 50% of the income gen-
erated by the film rights during the term of the note.199 To the
extent of such economic benefit, the transaction was motivated by
economic objectives and should not have been denied tax effect;
basis should have been equal to the fair market value of the right
to receive 50% of the income inherent in the film rights during the
term of the note. On this analysis, the partnership's basis in the
film rights could not have been greater than 200x dollars (50% of
the fair market value of the film rights), for the partnership's right
to receive 50% of the income generated by the film rights until the
maturity of the note could not have had a greater value than 50%
of the value of the film rights.
Why, then, did the Service conclude that the partnership was
entitled to a basis of 400x dollars? The Service's timidity is, per-
haps, understandable, inasmuch as the taxpayer had made a cash
payment of 500x dollars. This, however, is a misleading view of the
transaction, for the partnership did not acquire film rights with a
value of 400x dollars; rather, the partnership only acquired the
right to an income stream which had a value that was substantially
less than the 400x dollars. 00 The difference between the 500x dol-
197. Inasmuch as the taxpayer would be required to forfeit the film rights with a value
of 400x dollars upon failing to make payment on the 1500x dollar note, the transaction
provided the partnership with no economic benefit and was, therefore, motivated solely by
tax-reduction objectives.
198. See text & accompanying notes 149-60 supra.
199. The partnership was required to apply the other 50% of the income to its obliga-
tion on the note.
200. See note 153 supra.
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lars cash payment made by the partnership and the value of the
acquired income stream was, in essence, a payment for the ar-
rangement of the sham transaction and should have been disre-
garded for tax purposes.20 1
In sum, the government has begrudgingly applied the sham
doctrine. Rev. Rul. 79-432 and Rev. Rul. 80-42 both present trans-
actions that are appropriate subjects for the doctrine. Neverthe-
less, the Service, in both rulings, refused to properly apply the doc-
trine. In Rev. Rul. 79-432, the Service disregarded the nonrecourse
note under the likelihood-of-payment rationale and concluded,
without any analysis of the sham doctrine, that basis was equal to
the cash payment. Again, in Rev. Rul. 80-42, the Service excluded
the nonrecourse note from basis by reason of the likelihood-of-pay-
ment rationale, but, in failing to apply the sham doctrine, con-
cluded that a greater portion of the cash payment should have
been included in basis than was appropriate.0 2 Moreover, in Mor-
ris, the government argued that basis should have been equal to
the fair market value of the asset acquired, even though the trans-
action was a total sham - the transaction provided the taxpayer
with no economic benefit - and basis should have been zero. The
disdain the government has professed for abusive and overvalued
tax shelters is, indeed, belied by the diffidence it has exhibited in
its application of the sham doctrine.
CONCLUSION
There are three contexts in which a taxpayer will purchase an
asset at a price in excess of fair market value: 1) where the sole
purpose for the overpayment is tax reduction; 2) where there has
been a mistake as to value; or 3) where the taxpayer is anxious to
secure an additional asset or benefit from the seller.
An overpayment that is motivated solely by tax-avoidance
objectives should be excluded, by operation of the sham doctrine,
from basis computation. To the extent of the fair market value of
201. See note 153 supra.
202. See also Hager v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 759 (1981), where the government again
failed to argue that the cash payment should be excluded from basis even though the non-
recourse debt was unreasonably in excess of the value of the encumbered asset, But see
Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. No. 89 (filed Dec. 7, 1981), decided
while this article was at press, where the court utilized the sham doctrine to disregard the
entire transaction, including the cash investment.
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the acquired asset, however, economic motivation is present, and
the sham doctrine should not be applied. Thus, where a taxpayer
intentionally overpays for the sole purpose of securing tax reduc-
tion, basis should equal the fair market value of the acquired asset.
A different perspective of the sham doctrine is required where
a taxpayer utilizes a nonrecourse note substantially in excess of the
fair market value of the acquired asset. In these circumstances, it
is not merely the overpayment that is lacking in economic motiva-
tion. Rather, the entire transaction is induced solely by tax-avoid-
ance objectives, for neither the asset nor any other economic bene-
fit is acquired - inevitably, the asset will be forfeited in a
foreclosure proceeding. Such a transaction should yield no tax ben-
efits. Indeed, the cash investment, properly viewed as a fee for the
arrangement of a transaction that is a sham in its entirety, should,
together with the nonrecourse note, be excluded from basis.
Occasionally, a transaction involving a nonrecourse note sub-
stantially in excess of the value of the acquired asset is motivated,
to some extent, by economic objectives. This will occur where all of
the income generated by the acquired asset need not be applied in
discharge of the note. The acquisition is supported by economic
purpose, the desire to enjoy the income stream inherent in the as-
set. Thus, to the extent of the fair market value of the income
stream, the sham doctrine should not be applied.
There are, however, overpayments that should not be the sub-
ject of the sham doctrine. For example, a taxpayer who overpays
for an asset under an erroneous assumption of value is motivated
by economic objectives. Since it is economic motivation, and not
the desire to secure tax avoidance, that results in the inflated
purchase price, the sham doctrine should not be applied. Similarly,
where a taxpayer acquires an asset at an inflated price in order to
secure some additional asset or benefit, the sham doctrine should
play no role in the determination of basis. Although the overpay-
ment should be excluded from the basis computation, it should be
treated in accordance with the nature of the additional asset or
other benefit acquired.
Thus, the answer to the question posed at the outset - why
would a prudent taxpayer make an acquisition at a price in excess
of fair market value? - will determine the extent to which the
sham doctrine is applicable in the basis computation context and
the propriety of including an overpayment in basis.
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